# Global imbalances and destabilizing speculation<sup>\*</sup>

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### Abstract

Global imbalances have become a major source of systemic risk to the global economy. They can have adverse repercussions in the short and long term on both surplus and deficit economies due to the potentially disruptive effect of a sudden adjustment. They can be amplified by short term speculation that prevents the real exchange rate to perform its adjusting role. The paper examines past and recent patterns of destabilizing short term speculative flows that have led to financial fragility and real costs for a number of various economies. Domestic policies aimed at preventing speculation and overvaluation such as non-monetary anti-inflationary policies as well as temporary measures to constrain speculative flows should be coupled with globally coordinated policies to reduce global imbalances. Among the latter intermediate exchange rate regimes or regional cooperative schemes should be favoured. An international monetary system should provide a code of conduct, multilateral oversight and negotiations, and a multilateral body that could identify the size of the deviation enforce the necessary measures to correct the imbalances.

Keywords: foreign exchange, interest rate parity, global imbalances

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# 1. Introduction

As extensively discussed in the UNCTAD's *Trade and Development Report* (UNCTAD, 2004, 2005 and 2006), global imbalances have become a major source of systemic risk to the global economy. They can have adverse repercussions in the short and long term on both surplus and deficit economies due to the potentially disruptive effect of a sudden adjustment. As in past financial crises, the growing financial fragility induced by some types of capital inflows, associated with current-account deficits and the threat of an overshooting devaluation, may force deficit economies into contraction, which may spill over to trading partners.

However, if compared to the mid-1990s, the current number of deficit countries is rather small and, apart from the United States, their weight in the world economy is also fairly limited. Nevertheless, there are some regions where risk is highly concentrated, as in Eastern Europe and in some transition economies in Asia.

Domestic external imbalances are undoubtedly affected by the determinants of international competitiveness such as wage and price inflation, productivity growth via real exchange rate changes as shaped by the institutions and regulation in the financial, labour and product markets. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that speculative capital flows have a significant cumulative effect on macro aggregates creating systemic risk on both the financial system and real economy.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the paradox of the current pattern of world trade and financial imbalances where overvalued currencies may appreciate and undervalued currencies may depreciate. Indeed, the international adjustment mechanism can be undermined by many forms of speculative flows which can be triggered by a combination of global conditions and domestic monetary policies and can lead to financial fragility and to real costs for the affected economies. Sections 3 to 5 describe the role of "carry trade" positions, broadly defined as highly-leveraged cross-country operations exploiting interest-differentials and low currency volatility, in the current diverging pattern of global imbalances and real exchange rates. The real costs of such form of speculation are discussed in section 6. In section 7 and 8 it is pointed out how national and international policies need to address the major sources of imbalance by providing an institutional framework that would reduce the potential for speculative flows and promote coordinated efforts for exchange-rate adjustment and stable real exchange rates.

## 2. Widening global imbalances

The sources, sustainability and possible adjustment mechanisms of the widening external imbalances have been the object of one of the liveliest and most controversial economic policy debates of the past couple of decades. Trade flows correspond to real transfers of resources from surplus countries to deficit countries and are considered "imbalanced" when the inflows and outflows of a country vis-à-vis the rest of the world do not offset each other within a given period. On the basis of these accounting equivalences many observers have been claiming that imbalances are simply a natural and harmless consequence of an increasingly integrated global economy.

However, the actual pattern and level of the imbalances are a source of concern for those who believe that the size of any transfer of resources should remain within the expected long-run ability to pay interest and principal (UNCTAD 2006; UN-DESA/UNCTAD, 2007). In fact, the size and the direction of net capital flows for many years following the shocks of the big financial crises in Asia, Latin America and some transition economies, tend to support the belief that something is wrong in the global imbalance adjustment mechanism. Among those sharing this view, there is a perception that an adjustment is imminent and can be either "soft"

(i.e. with a smooth, policy induced correction) or "hard" (i.e. with a painful contraction and crisis in deficit countries with major adverse repercussions on surplus countries).

Nonetheless, there is an almost universally shared belief that changes in the overall competitiveness of an economy can be a decisive factor in reversing the sign of its trade balance. Indeed, large corrections of deficits are usually observed to go hand in hand with huge devaluations of the nominal and real exchange rate, and empirical evidence has shown that changes in the real effective exchange rate (REER) – the most comprehensive measure of the overall competitiveness of nations (UNCTAD 2004) – have the potential to reduce deficits or to induce swings in the trade and current-account from deficit to surplus (IMF, 2007 and Bundesbank, 2007).<sup>1</sup>

A depreciation of the real exchange rate, more than anything else, induces an "expenditure switch" from demand for foreign goods to demand for domestic goods, which is reflected in an improvement in the trade balance, and vice versa in the case of an appreciation. The swing from deficit to surplus in many crisis-stricken countries in Asia and Latin America was associated with huge devaluations of their currencies and large gains in competitiveness for their economies as a whole. This nexus between the exchange rate and trade flows is also acknowledged by those who believe that if the Chinese currency, the renminbi, were allowed to float freely, it would reduce the biggest surplus in the world and the biggest deficit at the same time.

Given this, few would question that a large or even rising current-account deficit, accompanied by a real appreciation and a loss in overall competitiveness, is a much stronger indicator of non-sustainability than a deficit and an overvalued currency alone. The currency of surplus countries is supposed to appreciate and not depreciate in real terms. If the most important price for exports and imports, the real exchange rate, consistently moves in the "wrong" direction, there is hardly an easy way out of a protracted imbalance. In other words, such "false" price movements should be avoided at all costs in order to allow the world economy to smoothly correct its global imbalances.<sup>2</sup>

But this "false pricing" is exactly what happens in many regions of the world. Looking roughly at the time pattern of the ratio of the current-account to GDP and the REER for some selected economies reveals "false pricing" to be a rather common phenomenon (table 1). Economies are grouped according to the size of their current-account surpluses or deficits. Countries with large surpluses include oil exporters such as the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia, and exporters of manufactures, such as China, Germany, Japan, Malaysia and Switzerland. Many East Asian and Latin American emerging market economies enjoy small surpluses, while members of the euro area, Mexico and Colombia register a slight deficit. Significant and persistent deficits are observable in South Africa, Turkey, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Hungary and other East European oil importing countries. The United States current account reached a record low of 6.6 per cent of its GDP in 2006, or more than \$850 billion.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> REER is a comprehensive measure of competitiveness of an economy with respect to its trading partners. It is calculated as the average of bilateral real exchange rates weighted with annual values of trade.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  The role of the real exchange rate in the international adjustment mechanism is regaining attention from the international financial institutions (see IMF, 2007), yet the policy prescriptions still depend on diverging views as to the sources of the real exchange rate misalignments and the ability of market forces to bring about the required adjustment of the balances. Recent experience tends to reject the case for an effective "market-led" adjustment or the belief that any single economy could independently impose its own correction measures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In *TDR 2006*, it was noted that some interpretations of this situation, mostly those blaming an excess of world savings relative to world investment demand, appear to be inconsistent not only with policy intuition and common sense but also with actual experience. Indeed, in terms of accounting, global imbalances correspond to

### Table 1

### REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE (1996 = 100) AND CURRENT-ACCOUNT (C/A) BALANCE, SELECTED ECONOMIES, 1996–2006

Economy	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	
		Economies with current-account surplus										
Economies with large current-accour	nt surplus											
China REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 7.2 0.8	106.8 34.4 3.6	112.4 31.6 3 1	106.3 15.7 1 4	109.2 20.5 1 7	114.6 17.4 1.3	111.9 35.4 2 4	106.6 45.9 2 8	105.1 68.7 3.6	107.5 160.8 7 2	109.9 238.5 10.3	
Japan REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 65.7 1.4	94.6 96.6 2.3	94.8 119.1 3.1	103.8 114.5 2.6	107.4 119.6 2.6	96.3 87.8 2.1	90.0 112.6 2.9	89.1 136.2 3.2	89.4 172.1 3.8	84.7 165.7 3.6	78.7 170.5 3.9	
Germany REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -14.0 -0.6	94.1 -10.0 -0.5	94.1 -16.3 -0.7	91.1 -26.9 -1.3	84.8 -32.6 -1.7	84.8 0.4 0.0	85.6 41.0 2.0	90.1 45.6 1.9	91.3 117.9 4.3	90.7 129.0 4.6	90.5 147.0 5.1	
Russian Federation REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 10.8 2.8	109.0 -0.1 -0.0	96.2 0.2 0.1	63.4 24.6 12.6	70.7 46.8 18.0	85.3 33.9 11.1	89.3 29.1 8.4	92.3 35.4 8.2	99.1 58.6 9.9	109.0 83.6 10.9	119.8 94.5 9.6	
Saudi Arabia REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 0.7 0.4	106.2 0.3 0.2	112.9 -13.1 -9.0	109.8 0.4 0.3	110.6 14.3 7.6	114.5 9.4 5.1	113.0 11.9 6.3	104.3 28.1 13.1	97.0 52.0 20.7	94.2 90.8 29.3	93.1 95.5 27.0	
Switzerland REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 22.0 7.3	92.2 25.5 9.7	96.1 26.1 9.7	96.0 29.4 11.1	89.7 30.7 12.4	92.6 20.0 8.0	98.1 23.0 8.3	99.7 43.0 13.3	97.7 50.5 14.1	94.1 61.0 16.5	89.9 63.5 16.8	
Malaysia REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -4.5 -4.4	96.8 -5.9 -5.9	79.7 9.5 13.2	78.9 12.6 15.9	79.3 8.5 9.4	83.3 7.3 8.3	83.2 8.0 8.4	79.6 13.2 12.7	76.4 14.9 12.6	75.5 19.9 15.2	75.5 25.6 16.9	
Economies with small current-account	nt surplus	;										
Brazil REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -23.5 -3.0	105.0 -30.5 -3.8	104.8 -33.4 -4.2	78.3 -25.3 -4.7	93.0 -24.2 -4.0	83.9 -23.2 -4.5	83.6 -7.6 -1.7	91.4 4.2 0.8	98.5 11.7 1.9	120.1 14.2 1.8	130.4 13.3 1.2	
Republic of Korea REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -23.1 -4.1	93.0 -8.3 -1.6	74.2 40.4 11.7	82.9 24.5 5.5	88.5 12.3 2.4	79.9 8.0 1.7	82.5 5.4 1.0	82.1 11.9 2.0	84.5 28.2 4.1	93.2 16.6 2.1	99.2 6.1 0.7	
Chile REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -3.1 -4.1	104.4 -3.7 -4.4	100.6 -3.9 -5.0	97.9 0.1 0.1	102.6 -0.9 -1.2	97.0 -1.1 -1.6	95.3 -0.6 -0.9	94.1 -1.0 -1.3	102.4 1.6 1.7	111.3 1.3 1.2	119.0 5.3 3.9	
Argentina REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -6.8 -2.5	104.9 -12.1 -4.1	107.9 -14.5 -4.8	114.0 -11.9 -4.2	111.8 -9.0 -3.2	117.3 -3.3 -1.2	63.8 8.7 8.9	69.9 8.0 6.3	68.2 3.3 2.2	67.5 5.6 3.1	65.6 8.0 3.7	
Indonesia REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -7.3 -2.9	92.9 -3.8 -1.6	48.5 4.0 3.8	74.5 5.8 3.7	71.9 8.0 4.8	69.2 6.9 4.3	83.4 7.8 4.0	88.3 8.1 3.5	82.0 1.6 0.6	82.9 0.9 0.3	102.2 9.7 2.7	

a misalignment of national savings with investment, and of national income with national expenditure. However, neither the savings-investment nor the income-expenditure gaps can be considered the direct sources of the trade imbalance and therefore of international real income transfers; rather these are the joint outcomes of income changes and relative price movements, such as shifts in the terms of trade, in the real exchange rate and in relative factor costs.

### REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE (1996 = 100) AND CURRENT-ACCOUNT (C/A) BALANCE, SELECTED ECONOMIES, 1996–2006

Economy	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	
		Economies with current-account deficit										
Economies with small current-acco	unt deficit											
Mexico REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -2.5 -0.8	113.5 -7.7 -1.9	114.4 -16.0 -3.8	125.0 -13.9 -2.9	138.1 -18.7 -3.2	145.9 -17.7 -2.8	147.1 -13.5 -2.1	136.8 -8.6 -1.4	135.7 -6.6 -1.0	142.5 -4.8 -0.6	146.4 -1.9 -0.2	
Colombia REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -4.6 -4.8	106.4 -5.8 -5.4	99.8 -4.9 -4 9	90.6 0.7 0.8	83.1 0.8 0.9	80.5 -1.1 -1.3	79.1 -1.4 -1.7	70.5 -1.0 -1.2	77.1 -0.9	87.5 -1.9 -1.6	86.1 -2.9 -2.2	
Euro area REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 	91.4 56.9 0.9	93.7 23.0 0.3	91.0 -34.0 -0.5	83.6 -91.7 -1.5	84.8 -19.3 -0.3	87.9 50.3 0.7	97.9 36.6 0.4	101.5 61.8 0.6	100.6 -28.8 -0.3	101.3 -20.1 -0.2	
Economies with large current-account deficit												
Hungary REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -1.8 -3.9	108.3 -2.0 -4.5	108.8 -3.4 -7.2	106.5 -3.8 -7.8	106.0 -4.0 -8.5	113.0 -3.2 -6.1	119.4 -4.6 -7.1	121.6 -7.2 -8.7	125.5 -8.7 -8.6	125.9 -8.1 -7.4	122.0 -6.2 -5.6	
New Zealand REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -3.9 -5.8	102.0 -4.3 -6.4	90.4 -2.1 -3.9	86.8 -3.5 -6.2	78.0 -2.7 -5.2	77.4 -1.4 -2.8	86.7 -2.4 -4.1	101.7 -3.4 -4.3	109.6 -6.5 -6.7	115.2 -9.6 -8.9	105.9 -9.4 -9.0	
South Africa REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -1.7 -1.2	105.7 -2.2 -1.5	95.8 -2.4 -1.8	92.0 -0.7 -0.5	90.6 -0.2 -0.1	82.2 0.1 0.1	73.4 0.7 0.6	97.6 -2.2 -1.3	106.6 -7.4 -3.4	107.5 -10.1 -4.2	101.5 -16.3 -6.5	
India REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -6.0 -1.6	104.3 -3.0 -0.7	99.5 -6.9 -1.7	99.4 -3.2 -0.7	101.2 -4.6 -1.0	103.5 1.4 0.3	99.9 7.1 1.4	99.5 8.8 1.5	100.5 0.8 0.1	103.7 -6.9 -0.9	100.4 -19.3 -2.1	
Turkey REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -2.1 -1.2	101.1 -2.1 -1.1	101.1 2.0 1.0	99.4 -1.3 -0.7	107.8 -9.8 -5.0	96.0 3.4 2.4	108.8 -1.5 -0.8	118.6 -8.0 -3.3	124.6 -15.6 -5.2	132.7 -23.1 -6.4	128.9 -31.5 -8.0	
Australia REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -15.7 -3.8	104.0 -12.4 -3.0	96.8 -18.4 -4.9	97.6 -22.4 -5.6	93.5 -15.2 -3.9	89.1 -7.7 -2.1	92.7 -16.2 -3.9	103.2 -29.5 -5.6	112.7 -40.1 -6.3	119.0 -42.2 -6.0	123.6 -40.6 -5.4	
United Kingdom REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -10.5 -0.9	114.1 -1.4 -0.1	119.0 -5.3 -0.4	117.0 -35.1 -2.4	114.7 -37.6 -2.6	111.5 -31.5 -2.2	112.7 -24.8 -1.6	109.6 -24.4 -1.3	114.5 -35.4 -1.6	111.7 -48.3 -2.2	111.4 -80.0 -3.5	
United States REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -124.8 -1.6	104.5 -140.4 -1.7	113.7 -213.5 -2.4	113.8 -299.8 -3.2	115.0 -415.2 -4.2	122.0 -389.0 -3.8	122.0 -472.4 -4.5	112.7 -527.5 -4.8	105.8 -665.3 -5.7	102.9 -791.5 -6.4	99.8 -869.1 -6.6	
EU – Central and Eastern Europe <sup>a</sup> REER C/A balance (\$ billion) C/A balance as per cent of GDP	100.0 -14.4 -4.1	104.4 -16.6 -4.7	110.6 -18.6 -4.9	106.1 -22.3 -6.0	111.0 -20.3 -5.5	119.5 -16.7 <u>-4.</u> 1	122.1 -18.5 -4.1	121.0 -23.8 -4.4	125.9 -37.5 -5.8	136.2 -31.3 -4.1	142.6 -38.8 <u>-4.</u> 7	

Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on IMF, Balance of Payment Statistics; and International Financial Statistics databases; and JP Morgan through Thomson Financial DataStream database.

a Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Table 1 also shows the paradox of false pricing for a number of surplus economies with officially floating exchange rates: Japan had a significant real depreciation, while Germany and Switzerland had smaller ones. China, the country most under political pressure to float its currency, shows a much stronger tendency towards appreciation than the free floaters. Under a floating regime and high mobility (and low regulation) of capital, the nominal and real

exchange rates can move in the wrong direction from a balance-of-payments point of view, thereby hindering the adjustment process and making the constellation of deficits and surpluses unsustainable.

This suggests that a shift to floating and capital openness may not provide a solution to the global imbalances, and, more generally, raises questions about the role of the financial system in the determination of capital flows, nominal and real exchange rates and real imbalances. Indeed, various forms of domestic and international financial speculation have been associated with episodes of consumption booms, current-account deficits and overvalued currencies. If speculation is an important source of real exchange rate misalignments and of persistent diverging patterns of global real balances, domestic and international regulations and policies have to provide the conditions for generating converging patterns of trade balances and a coherent adjustment of the imbalances.

The following section describes how speculative capital flows, concomitant false pricing and the resulting misalignments are induced by short-term interest rate differentials and floating currencies in perfectly open markets. In light of the evidence, both policy targets for exchange rates and a new assignment of monetary and non-monetary instruments at the national level need to be reconsidered.

# 3. Speculative flows induced by "carry trade"

In the past couple of years a widespread and persistent speculative phenomenon involving currencies of developed and developing countries with large short-term interest rate differentials has drawn considerable attention from the media and financial analysts as well as concerns by central bankers. "Carry trade" has become a catchphrase to define the specific financial operation of borrowing and selling a low-yielding currency to buy and lend in a high-yielding currency. For example, an established speculator such as a hedge fund might borrow 12,000 yen in Japan, buy 100 dollars in the United States, invest this amount in United States bonds and obtain an interest revenue equal to the difference between the borrowing rate in Japan, say 0.25 per cent, and the higher lending rate in the United States, say 5 per cent. Exchange rate changes between the time of borrowing and paying back the funding currency can add to the gains, or induce smaller gains or even losses. But with stable exchange rates, the interest rate gain amounts to 4.75 per cent. However, both gains and losses are largely magnified by high leverage ratios, since traders typically use huge amounts of borrowed funds and very little equity. For instance, owning a capital of \$10 and borrowing 10 times the equivalent of that value in yen, the leverage factor of 10 leads to a net interest return on equity of 47.5 per cent.

This simple and hardly new form of speculation may appear too straightforward to be possible in highly developed and integrated capital markets, yet it has represented a substantial source of profits, inducing huge amounts of capital flows and pressure on exchange rates since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the beginning 1970s. It has gained a new quantitative dimension, since more or less unregulated funds have nearly unlimited access to massive pools of capital from pension funds or wealthy citizens.

Carry trade is fundamentally based on the expectation that, given a sufficiently large interest rate differential between the borrowing and the lending currency – which is quasi fixed by monetary policies in both countries – the exchange rate will either remain stable or move in a favourable direction, or allow a major withdrawal from the currency before profits are fully eroded. On the other hand, in today's markets, the volume of speculative flows stemming from these funds is so large that they have a direct effect on the exchange rate, thereby creating a self-fulfilling expectation of profit in excess of the interest rate differential. In the

example cited above, a devaluation of the yen and a revaluation of the dollar induced by carry trade would increase the net return on equity well beyond 47.5 per cent

This implies that national policies aimed at fighting domestic inflation by rising interest rates may end up providing strong incentives to this kind of speculation if other countries have different inflation and interest rates. The ensuing over- or undervaluation may offset or magnify the effects of the desired monetary policies, generating financial fragility and huge real adjustment costs to the national economy and the global economic system. The fundamental mechanism of real-exchange-rate adjustment that, according to widespread political expectations, would allow a smooth correction of imbalances would be undermined. Flows moving from low-yielding, low-inflation countries to high-yielding, high-inflation countries would cause the currencies of the latter to appreciate, and provoke the paradoxical and dangerous combination of surplus economies experiencing pressures to depreciate, and deficit countries facing a correspondent pressure to appreciate.

Carry trade has recently involved mostly high- and medium-income economies such as Australia, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States, and a few emerging market economies such as Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Republic of Korea, as well as some transition economies such as Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states. Over the past two years, yen- and Swiss franc-funded carry trade operations appeared to be responsible for the large volatility and gyrations of some of the high-yielding currencies, such as the New Zealand and Australian dollars, the Hungarian forint, Brazilian real, Korean won and the Icelandic krona. The latter for instance experienced typical crisis symptoms: prolonged periods of steady appreciation and capital inflows, disrupted by shorter periods of sharp devaluations as carry traders unwound their positions. This happened in Iceland, for example, between March and May 2005, February and April 2006, November 2006 and January 2007. The experience of the krona is indeed indicative. Figure 1 shows past carry trade potentials driven by the nominal exchange-rate dynamics and the interest rate differentials between the Japanese yen and the Icelandic krona (left panel) and US dollar (right panel). The red thick line represents a 3-month interest rate differential between a krona- and a yen-denominated asset; the blue thin line is the exchange-rate change of the krona vis-à-vis the yen for the same period, while their sum (the shaded area) is the return on a 3-month (uncovered) lending in the Icelandic market by borrowing in Japan in local currencies. Since this return carries the risk of exchange-rate changes, it is hereafter called "uncovered interest return" (UIR).



Figure 1: Yen-carry trade on the Icelandic krona and US dollar since 2005.

Indeed, the dollar itself has been the target of "yen carry traders" and, to a lesser extent, of traders borrowing in Swiss francs, at least since the rise of the fed funds rate between 2004 and 2006. But the yen carry trade return potentials on the dollar have been low compared to uncovered returns plus real appreciation of a number of developing and transition economies in relation to the dollar itself.

According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2007), hedge funds have been the main players and the main beneficiaries of trades using the yen and Swiss franc as funding currencies for buying assets in some of the countries mentioned above. A comparison of carry-to-risk ratios (the three-month interest rate differential divided by the implied volatility of the currency option) provides further evidence that there is a clear tendency for the currencies of some developing countries like the Brazilian real and the Turkish lira to become increasingly more attractive than traditional carry trade targets such as the Australian and New Zealand dollars and the pound sterling. However, speculative flows are difficult to identify and monitor. As noted in the BIS study, measuring the volume of carry trade is problematic because of lack of data and the variety of forms that these flows can take.

The specific episodes of carry trade deserve attention as warning signals that even financially developed medium- to high-income countries are not immune to destabilizing capital flows. Besides that, the phenomenon may be regarded as a "species" of the broader "genus" of potentially destabilizing speculative capital-account operations; it displays numerous similarities with the mechanisms that caused financial fragility in many emerging markets, leading thereafter to currency and financial crises in the mid-1990s. The more general mechanisms of destabilizing speculation, on the other hand, may easily involve emerging markets and small, open developing economies that have access to capital markets and adopt different monetary policies due to differing inflation histories.

Other countries, such as Brazil and Turkey, have experienced a steady appreciation of their currencies despite fairly high inflation rates. The Brazilian and Turkish real appreciation and large interest rate differentials vis a vis the other major currencies and particular the yen have allowed for large gains in carry trade which persist despite the mid-2006 turbulence (figure 2).



Figure 2: Yen-carry trade on the Brazilian real and Turkey lira, since 2005.

While such speculative operations naturally involve a currency risk for speculators, that can be attenuated by diversifying the portfolio of high-yielding currencies, the risk for both the funding and lending currencies cannot be diversified, and can therefore become a source of "systemic risk", spilling over from the financial system to the real economy. The web of different funding and lending currencies of otherwise unrelated economies causes the countries involved to become interdependent and subject to reversals of perceptions and to contagion.

Contagion spreads due to speculators' profit maximization motives: unwinding of positions in one country affects all the web-related economies. Such unwinding may be triggered by "conventional focal points" such as the external balance or growth, or the inflation prospects of the funding currency causing fear of an interest correction and an exchange-rate jump. For instance, it has been debated as to whether the speculative run on the Icelandic krona was triggered by the perceived non-sustainability of the huge current-account deficit, by a downgrade from some rating agency, or even by a piece of "good news" related to the funding currency, such as an improvement in the Japanese economy which had the potential of an interest rate increase and an appreciation of the yen. Undoubtedly, the carry trade unwinding from the krona had a significant impact not only on the Icelandic financial and credit system, but also on some third parties involved, namely some emerging markets such as Brazil and Turkey, as traders needed to cash in some of their earnings from well-performing currencies to cover some of their losses from the krona trade (figures 1 and 2).

While uncovered gains and losses can be significant, their volatility depends entirely on fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. Periods of relative stability and large interest rate differentials provide strong incentive to traders, as in 2005 and late-2006. During that period the dollar appreciated vis-à-vis the two funding currencies, despite high and rising current-account deficits and higher inflation rates in the United States than in Japan or Switzerland. On the other hand, the carry trade is such a psychological game that does not require big changes in the interest differentials to be reversed. The yen and dollar movement are under scrutiny and has become focal points that can trigger wider reversal. A sudden pick up of expected volatility, as in the mid-2006 and in the summer 2007, can trigger a large unwinding of investments and spill over to emerging market economies. Currency volatility discourages carry trade operation by raising the risk that gains from interest are differentials between the funding and the target currency may be eroded by adverse exchange rate movement. On the other had the reversal of the positions generates the volatility and the adverse exchange rate changes that lead to further reversal of the flows.

The summer 2007 turmoil originated in the US subprime credit market and spreading to other segments of the financial and credit markets worldwide affected carry trade operation and was amplified by sudden carry trade unwinding.

Figure 3 shows the most recent trend in the US \$/yen exchange rate and the rate of change. A strong appreciation of the yen, since the end of June, is associated with an increase in volatility visible in the large jumps from significant appreciations to minor depreciations.



Figure 3: Recent yen-carry trade unwinding and currency volatility with the US dollar. Yen per US \$ (left) and daily rate of change (right). Bank of Japan.

The expectations of lower US rates to ease tight liquidity conditions and slightly increasing rates in Japan reflecting its inflationary pressures played a clear role in these latest developments. However, this trend change seems to be largely affected by increasing currency market volatility and rising risk aversion of speculators.

The evidence for the Brazilian Real is supportive of the hypothesis that the scare of crisis is propagating to emerging markets, leading to larger risk aversion and reducing the demand for increasingly perceived risky assets making the currency carry trade less appealing. Currency carry trade towards the Brazilian real is partly unwinding due to the increasing volatility of both Japanese yen and US \$. Despite a persistently large interest differential between Brazilian assets and the latter currencies scared investors are looking towards safer assets (Figure 4).



Figure 4: Recent dollar-carry trade unwinding and currency volatility with the Brazilian real. Brazil Reais per US \$ (left) and daily rate of change (right). Banco Central do Brazil.

According to the Bank of Korea yen-carry trade funds that entered the Korean market only in the last year amounted to US\$ 6 billion for an approximated amount of 29 billion 10 per cent of total foreign reserve. The effects of the carry trade have hurt the export competitiveness of the nation's small and medium-sized businesses. The strength of the won has hurt exporters while the weakness of the yen has favoured the export-dependent Japanese economy. The sudden depreciation of the won, mostly attributed to carry trade reversals, has raised concerns of small and medium size business that borrowed in yen to finance real estate and stock market investments (figure 5). As in the case of Hungary this sudden carry trade reversal could trigger the local housing bubble lead to further liquidity shortage.



Figure 5: Recent yen-carry trade unwinding and currency volatility with the Korean won. Korean won per Japanese yen (left) and daily rate of change (right). Bank of Korea.

### 4. Domestic policies and speculation opportunities

In figure 6, figure 7, and figure 8, below, the short-term speculative potentials defined as above (right charts) are depicted together with the inflation differential and the real exchange rate dynamics (left charts). In the latter charts, the green solid line represents the inflation rate differential between the selected economy and the United States, while the shaded area is the change in the real exchange rate, that is, the sum of inflation rate differential and the change in the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar (blue thin line in the right charts). An index of the real exchange rate is plotted on the left panel (blue dashes) and measured on the right vertical axis.<sup>4</sup> While the dollar is used as reference for comparison between the countries' trends and the rest of the world, it is easy to estimate the potentials of yen-funded carry trade by combining the latter figures with figure 1. In appendix, figure A1 to figure A4 show the same variables aggregated per region and averaged quarter by quarter.



Figure 6- Brazil - Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials, 1995-2007.

The examples of Brazil, Turkey and China show how alternative exchange-rate regimes and their differing monetary policies generate varying degrees of speculative opportunities for the international capital markets; they also show how much real appreciation (loss of overall competitiveness for a nation) can result from speculation that is driven by interest rate differentials. Pre-crisis Brazil was characterized by an overvalued real exchange rate, large interest rate differentials (aimed at maintaining capital inflows in a condition of financial fragility) and unsustainable costs for the real economy (figure 6). Despite the slight real depreciation of the real due to a crawling peg exchange rate, the 1999 crisis forced a large nominal depreciation and led to an interest rate hike. The post-crisis change in the monetary regime included official floating of the exchange rate and implementation of an inflationtargeting monetary policy (Barbosa, 2006). Despite relatively high inflation rates (compared to international trends), Brazil experienced a tendency towards nominal and real appreciation induced by short-term capital inflows. In 2006, the real exchange rate had nearly returned to its 1996 level. Large interest rate differentials aimed at curbing inflation offered considerable potential gains for short-term speculation; indeed, they were comparable in size to those of the pre-1999 monetary regime.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> To reduce its volatility, induced by monthly nominal exchange rate fluctuations, we use a 6-month moving average of the real exchange rate, with 2000 as the basis year.



Figure 7. Turkey - Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials, 2995-2007.

Turkey provides an example of frequent changes in the monetary regime, resulting in large and volatile nominal exchange-rate changes and frequent real appreciation (mostly induced by large inflation rate differentials), and constantly associated with large uncovered returns on short-term capital (generated by the large interest rate differentials). Financial turbulence struck the country in 1999 and culminated in November 2000 (figure 7). Despite substantial financial assistance by the IMF (since December 1999) and substantial portfolio capital inflows, the financial situation once again became unsustainable in February 2001. GDP contracted by 5 per cent in 1999, grew by 7 per cent in 2000 and ended up with a fall of -7.4 per cent in 2001, displaying an extreme kind of boom and bust. The central bank officially gave up control of the exchange rate and, since November 2002, the post-crisis IMF stabilization programme has been officially based on two pillars of financial restraint: a primary surplus target for fiscal deficits and an inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy. However, this again has resulted in a strong tendency towards real appreciation and large uncovered interest returns. Only recently has the country managed to significantly reduce the interest rate differential, which fell below 3 per cent between July 2005 and March 2006. But with a very high real exchange rate and widening current-account deficits, the value of the currency dropped at the end of 2006 preceded by significant capital outflows. Turkey's frequent boom-bust cycles are clearly driven by the effects of potential and actual short-term capital flows (Telli, Voyvoda and Yeldan, 2007).



Figure 8: China - Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials, 1995-2007.

By contrast, China's exchange rate, capital market and monetary regimes have been extremely stable over a long period of time (figure 8). A strictly pegged nominal exchange rate, low inflation and low interest rates have led to stable expectations by investors in fixed capital and have not attracted any short-term capital speculators. In particular, due to low nominal and real interest rates, short-term returns have been nil or negative, and have discouraged speculative capital flows of the carry trade type. A slight and consistent tendency towards real depreciation vis-à-vis the dollar has only recently levelled off following the authorities' decision to allow a moderate nominal appreciation in 2005 and 2006.

In the past, in many cases managed depreciation or pegging of exchange rates, associated with large interest rate and inflation rate differentials, have led to real appreciation and the loss of competitiveness, and have offered opportunities for speculation. This occurred to a large extent in pre-crisis Brazil, Thailand, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation in the 1990s (see also figures 9 and 10).

Unfortunately, the regime switch to floating and inflation targeting improved the situation only in those countries that were able to consistently reduce the interest rate differential against the United States. In many other cases, despite slightly lower inflation and interest rate differentials, the tendency towards real appreciation continued unabated. Moreover, the opportunities for international speculation, though subject to larger exchange-rate risk, have not faded; instead, they remain a major source of instability and risk. Short-term interest rates, as the main instrument to combat inflation, have generated new opportunities for large-scale speculation on the currency market. The real costs for the economies will be very high if the restrictive effects of chronic real appreciation add to high real interest rates and penalize nonsubsidized domestic capital formation.



Figure 9. Argentina, Thailand and Rep. of Korea - Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials, 1995-2006.



Figure 10. Hungary, Russian Federation and South Africa - Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials, 1995-2006.

## 5. Changing speculation opportunities in emerging market economies

Carry trade, as any other form of speculation on international interest rate differentials that is not covered in the forward currency market, involves a currency risk. Speculative capital flows typically respond to short-term current and expected monetary variables, such as the interest rate, the exchange rate, liquidity and risk. A floating exchange regime supposedly increases the risk and discourages such operations, while a fixed exchange regime provides a (partial) guarantee of exchange stability, and therefore encourages speculation. However, specific experience of carry trade in officially floating currencies does not confirm this hypothesis. Indeed, floating currencies under various monetary policy regimes, rather than being immune to speculative operations actually stimulate them if the amounts available to investors are big enough to drive the market in a certain direction.

Integrating risk into the analysis implies fundamental difficulties in assessing attraction for speculative capital flows and their effect on the real exchange rate. One difficulty is related to the definition and measurement of expectations and of perceived risk, because they are very sensitive to arbitrary behavioural assumptions. For the sake of simplicity, we look again at the ex-post uncovered interest rate returns, and take the associated currency volatility as a measure of risk, to figure out what, on average, could be the gains from speculation, bearing in mind that expectations can be strongly adaptive under rather predictable environments. This implies that even a floating exchange-rate regime can provide a stable and comfortable environment for speculators as long as exchange rates do not systematically offset interest rate margins and the exchange rate movements can be influenced by the herd behaviour of speculators.

This raises the question of how to come to grips with a central tenet of macroeconomic analysis, the assertion that there are always strong stabilizing forces on the capital market which will tend to quickly remove any arbitrage gain and lead to the uncovered interest parity (UIP). The UIP states that capital flows find equilibrium when the expected devaluation of a currency compensates for the interest rate differential obtained by investing in that currency and represents a fundamental tenet of our theoretical conventional wisdom and a building block of standard macroeconomic models. Capital inflows and outflows would find equilibrium if the incentive to buy a currency and invest abroad, driven by an interest rate spread, is completely offset by the potential loss of the currency value, that is, if the positive interest rate spread is compensated by an expected devaluation of the exchanged currency. This implies that assets denominated in a different currency should have the same return so that no extra profit can be made by exchanging them. On the other hand, it also implies that it should not be profitable to short- sell or borrow in a currency and lend uncovered in another. The uncovered interest parity condition is therefore an equilibrium condition that rules out excess demand in the international market. Coupled with the assumption that expectations are formed in a fully rational way (market participants use efficiently all the information available), it becomes a manifestation of the market efficiency hypothesis that states that any security prices (exchange rate included) reflect all available information, and that no unexploited extra profit is possible.

The literature on the validity of parity has been extensive and has strongly rejected the joint assumptions of UIP and of exchange rate expectations on the basis of "perfect rationality". Attempts to solve the rational-expectation UIP puzzle either by adding a time varying risk premium, or by assuming a transitional learning period, or by adding "noisy traders", have delivered theoretically and empirically controversial results.

The carry trade phenomenon, as well as many other profitable speculative activities, not only clearly violate the parity condition, but also give additional support to its related "forward-premium puzzle" (Burnside et al., 2007). The evidence that currencies at a forward premium tend to depreciate while currencies at a forward discount tend to appreciate implies that positive interest rate differentials are systematically associated with appreciation. The parity can preserve its theoretical relevance for analysing the possible market equilibrium configurations by avoiding any strict assumptions on expectation formation and determination of perceived risk.

Traditional macroeconomic analysis would assume that currency volatility tends to reduce any form of speculation. However, even allowing for a certain degree of risk aversion on the part of speculators (meaning that for identical expected returns they will choose the assets with a smaller risk), *exchange-rate flexibility* does not discourage portfolio and currency speculation unless interest rate differentials could be offset by the risk of depreciation, in periods of extreme volatility. In particular, if the herd behaviour of speculators is sufficient to influence appreciate the target currency, the appeal of large returns is sufficient to generate them.



Figure 11. Average uncovered interest return and currency volatility in selected economies and periods.

Figure 11 gives an idea of the possible relationship between risk and returns for some pre- and post-crisis periods for some emerging market economies. The average quarterly returns created by the exploitation of interest rate differentials (vertical axis) are plotted against the volatility of the nominal exchange rate (horizontal axis). The two points for each country compare the situation before and after crisis episodes – periods of exceptional volatility and change.<sup>5</sup> Large gains at relatively low risk were possible in the 1990s in the case of Brazil and Mexico before their respective crises. Turkey offered spectacular returns in both periods, but these were associated with rather high risk. The Republic of Korea provided much smaller but more stable returns, while China attracted no capital inflows.

The more recent periods display higher risk in the case of Brazil and the Republic of Korea, but still very high returns in Brazil. In Turkey and Mexico, the uncovered return decreases, but the risk is more or less unchanged. Both countries and Brazil remained attractive places for international speculators even after the regime change to floating and lower interest rates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Brazil 1995-1998 and 2003-2006, China 1995-1997 and 1998-2006, Mexico 1996-1999 and 2000-2006, the Republic of Korea 1995-1996 and 1999-2006, and Turkey 1995-2000 and 2003-2006.

In general, there has been either an increase in risk, as in Brazil and the Republic of Korea, due to a switch to a floating exchange rate, or a fall in the return, as in Mexico and Turkey, due to a reduction in the interest rate differentials after the monetary regime change. Turkey, Brazil and Mexico, given the combination of return and risk, remained subject to the same kind of speculation before and after changes in their monetary regime.

### 6. Real cost of speculation

We define  $\omega$ ,  $\rho$ ,  $\delta$ ,  $\pi$ , and  $\pi^*$  as the uncovered interest return, the real appreciation, the nominal appreciation, the domestic and foreign inflation rates, respectively, and observe that  $\rho = \pi - \pi^* + \delta$ , and

 $\omega = i - i^* + \delta$ ,

that is, the rate of real appreciation is the sum of the inflation differential and the nominal rate of appreciation, while the uncovered interest return is the sum of the interest rate differential and the nominal appreciation.

Large returns on uncovered interest rate speculation as well as large real returns for domestic financial investors penalize international competitiveness and capital formation through high levels of the real exchange rate and the real interest rate. Figure 12 shows uncovered interest return,  $\omega$  (vertical axis), and real exchange rate appreciation,  $\rho$  (horizontal axis), for some developed and emerging markets, while in figure A5, in the appendix, economies are aggregated per region and averaged year by year.

The real interest rate  $r \equiv i - \pi$  is defined as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation. The difference between the uncovered return,  $\omega$ , and the real appreciation  $\rho$  is the real interest rate differential  $\gamma \equiv r - r^*$ , between the observed economy and the United States with

$$\omega - \rho = (i - i^*) - (\pi - \pi^*) - \delta + \delta = (i - \pi) - (i^* - \pi^*) = r - r^*.$$

This is a measure of the relative cost of capital formation (i.e. the cost to start a business or to extend existing businesses by investment in fixed capital in the country concerned). Graphically, the difference to the United States is the vertical distance of any observation point from the bisecting line line in the  $(\rho, \omega)$  space (the line with dashes in each chart). The further above the bisecting line the scatter points are, the higher the cost of capital compared to the United States. The observation points in figure 10 (each representing a three-month investment) are grouped into a pre-crisis or pre-regime change period (orange colour), crisis and transitional period (red) and post-crisis or post-regime change period (green colour).

The relation between points in the  $(\rho, \omega)$  space can be easily captured by identifying the parameters:  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  obtained by regressing the relation

 $i-i^*+\delta = \beta(\pi-\pi^*+\delta)+\alpha$ ,

which implies

 $i - i^* = \beta (\pi - \pi^*) - (1 - \beta)\delta + \alpha$ 

with  $\beta$  capturing the comovements of  $\pi - \pi^*$ ,  $i - i^*$  and  $\delta$ , and with  $\alpha$  measuring a structural tendency of having larger nominal interest rates. The dispersion of the points along the trend line and the length of the dispersion indicate large volatility of the exchange rate and/or inflation and of the interest rate differentials.

For values close to  $\beta = 1$  and  $\alpha = 0$ , returns and the real exchange rate move along the bisecting line. Real rates of return are close to those of the United States, while interest rate differentials closely follow inflation differentials. Nominal exchange rate changes can be significant and induce large changes in the real appreciations,  $\rho$ , and the returns,  $\omega$ , but do not have an effect on interest rates and inflation rates.

For values close to  $\beta = 1$  and for  $\alpha > 0$ , returns and real exchange rates move on a 45° line, and similar considerations apply to the relation between the variables; however interest rates tend to be persistently larger than those of the United States.

For values of  $\beta > 1$ , the real interest rate differential  $\gamma$  is greater the larger the values of  $\rho$  and  $\omega$ .

A nominal appreciation is associated with tightening of monetary conditions (with a coefficient  $\beta - 1$ , for a given inflation rate differential), a nominal depreciation is associated with larger inflation (with a coefficient equal to  $(1 - \beta)/\beta$ , for a given interest rate differential), and monetary policy responds to inflation by changing the interest rates (at a rate equal to  $\beta$ , for a given exchange rate). The larger  $\beta$ , the larger is the pass-through of the exchange rate on prices and the smaller is the effect of a nominal depreciation required to preserve a competitive real exchange rate. Large interest changes are associated with smaller inflation rate changes. Large values of  $\omega$  relative to  $\rho$  are also consistent with a state of hyperinflation where large nominal depreciations and interest rate differentials fail to prevent real appreciations and loss of competitiveness. Reverse considerations apply for  $\beta < 1$ .

For most of the economies that experienced a change in their monetary regime, with or without a crisis, their trend line shifted downwards with a reduction of the interest rate differential but not necessarily a reduction in volatility of the exchange rate, inflation rate and interest rate. Economies that lie close to the bisecting line enjoyed low interest rate differentials and displayed a close association of interest rate and inflation rate differentials. This applies to Chile, Japan and the euro area, and to the post-crisis Republic of Korea and Thailand. Exchange-rate changes have been significant, particularly for the first three economies, and have been the main source of changes in both the real exchange rate and uncovered returns.



Figure 12. Real exchange rate changes and uncovered interest returns in selected economies, 1995-2006.

For example, Japan and the euro area show a clear tendency to move parallel to the bisecting line, which implies that the exchange rate has not been a concern for the monetary authorities; they have preferred to use nominal (and real) interest rates to control inflation or (deflation). This has induced large swings in the uncovered returns and real appreciation rates. But in the case of the euro area, they have largely offset each other, while in the case of Japan, the observations are concentrated around a low real interest rate, which has invited speculation that has driven the yen down.

For Thailand and the Republic of Korea, after their crises, the change in their monetary regimes from soft peg to float was accompanied by large exchange-rate volatility, but with a tendency towards real appreciation. Larger volatility in Indonesia, on the other hand, went hand in hand with even larger appreciation and no significant reduction in interest rates. Again, China displays its own distinctive pattern of negative real interest rates and a fixed exchange rate, which, given a high degree of stability and the very low cost of capital, has been favourable to the creation of fixed capital through investment.

Brazil, Hungary Mexico, South Africa and Turkey have recently adopted an inflationtargeting monetary regime that typically requires a free float of the currency and control of inflation rates through interest rates. Although the post-crisis regime marked a deep structural changes for Brazil, Hungary, Mexico and Turkey, with a clear shift towards a lowering of interest rates and inflation rate differentials, the level of interest rates is still very high, volatility is large, and the tendency towards real appreciation and a deterioration in overall competitiveness persists for Brazil, Hungary, South Africa and Turkey. Their high real interest rate, consistently larger than the United States benchmark, constrains capital accumulation and may generate inflationary pressures by reducing capacity growth in the longer run.

## 7. National policies to prevent speculation

For small open economies, and developing countries in particular, a stable and prospering external sector is crucial. That is why the exchange rate is the most important single price in these economies, as it dominates overall competitiveness and has a strong impact on the national price level. Recent studies have found that a "competitive and stable" real exchange rate is a key economic policy tool for developing countries because it enables a persistent pattern of export expansion and investment growth based on a profit–investment nexus (UNCTAD 2004 and 2006; Rodrik, 1995) allowing to take advantage of favourable fundamentals, externalities and proper institutions (Eichengreen, 2007). The challenge for national policies is to combine the control of inflation rates, which has taken centre stage in many developing countries, with international competitiveness and low exchange-rate variability and in a world of free and volatile short-term capital flows.

As emphasized in UNCTAD (2004, chap. IV), large inflation differentials lead to large interest rate spreads, because central banks use the interest rate as the principal instrument to curb inflation via a contraction in credit and demand. But nominal returns are the focus of carry trade by financial investors. These investors are not concerned with inflation differentials and other fundamentals per se, as long as they do not constitute a threat to the stability of the currency and therefore to their expected profits. The capital inflows induced by nominal interest rate spreads, coupled with an exchange rate that is perceived as either stable or appreciating, on average, or even depreciating but still allowing for sufficient returns, have huge repercussions for the real economy and for current-account imbalances worldwide.

The financial and real systemic effects of portfolio capital inflows vary according to the specific institutional, structural and even cyclical situation of the recipient economy. Financial development and intermediation, the size of the inherited internal and external debt, the composition of production and of the trade balance affect the capacity to absorb the flows and their impact on relative prices and on growth. Nevertheless, the scenarios that characterize emerging market financial fragility and volatility share common features. Under a fixed exchange rate or crawling peg regime, capital inflows boost reserves, money creation and credit expansion, which may induce consumption growth and inflation and an import surge. Under an officially floating exchange regime, they can induce nominal and real appreciation and increase reserves to the extent that the central bank, openly or implicitly, is willing to

contain exchange-rate changes. There may be a time lag in their effects on the real side of the economy but it may be critical. An overvalued exchange rate penalizes exports and reduces competitiveness, and therefore the growth of firms in the traded-goods sector. This in turn adversely affects income and growth in general. Finally, deteriorating economic conditions may make the country the object of a renewed focus on "bad fundamentals"; the exchange rate may sharply devalue and the central bank's ability to contain inflation may be called into question.

If targeting inflation via interest rates involves serious additional costs by inducing capital inflows, such anti-inflationary strategies have to be weighed against alternatives that might be less tried and tested but may yield significant longer run real benefits. These alternatives may be found in the new and heterodox national macroeconomic policies applied with outstanding success in most of Asia (UNCTAD 2006, chap. IV, D.). In this approach, monetary policy focuses mainly on the external sector, including the exchange rate. Inflation is controlled by other factors and policies than those controlled by the central bank: typically, well-designed income policies taking into account the existing labour market institutions have played a leading role.

Avoiding large gains for foreign investors from short-term arbitrage operations keeps the *actual* rate of appreciation in check and cuts the link between these capital flows and the real exchange rate, thus maintaining a country's competitiveness. Successful countries were consistently able to prevent persistent real appreciation. This may require policies to restrain short-term capital inflows and outflows through regulation as long as the expected profitability from speculation cannot be reduced by a traditional set of policies like an interest rate reduction. Internal and external debt restructuring may help limit the effect of international speculation by reducing nominal interest rates.

## 8. Globally coordinated policies to reduce global imbalances

The ongoing carry trade from the yen or Swiss franc, from countries with very low inflation and very low nominal interest rates to countries with higher inflation and higher interest rates, such as Brazil, Hungary or New Zealand, breaks the vital link between interest rate differentials and the risk of currency depreciation. If floating exchange rates do not follow the purchasing power rule in the short term and destabilize the external accounts, then international policy should aim at preserving this rule as a policy target. Unhedged borrowing by hedge funds and other speculators more than anything else raises questions about the wisdom of widespread acceptance of floating as the only feasible solution to the problem of the external balance.

That is why the political pressure on China to float its currency may end up producing exactly the opposite of the result expected. As China's interest rates are still rather low, it is by no means clear that the renminbi will appreciate if China were to give in to the pressure from the United States and float its exchange rate. The renminbi might risk following the examples of the yen and the Swiss franc and be carried to high interest rate locations. If that were to happen, it would depreciate and cause a further increase in China's competitiveness instead of reducing it. Such an outcome would clearly worsen the global imbalances.

Developing countries in general need flexibility and a sufficient number of instruments to prevent excessive volatility of the whole external sector which threatens long-term investment and successful catching up. Evidence does not support the orthodox belief that, with free floating, international financial markets will perform that role by smoothly adjusting exchange rates to their "equilibrium" level, while with fixed exchange rates, product, financial and labour markets will always be flexible enough to smoothly and rapidly adjust to a new

equilibrium. In reality, exchange rates under a floating regime have proved to be highly unstable, leading to long spells of misalignment, with grave consequences for the real economic activity of the countries concerned. The experience with hard pegs has not been satisfactory either: the exchange rate could not be corrected in cases of external shocks or misalignment, adjustments were costly in terms of lost output, and the real sectors of the domestic economy bore the brunt.

Given this experience with rigidly fixed and freely floating exchange rates, "intermediate" regimes have become the preferred option in most developing countries with open capital markets; they provide more room for manoeuvre when there is instability in international financial markets and enable adjustment of the real exchange rate to a level more in line with a country's development strategy. None of the "corner solutions" offer these possibilities. Developing countries that are not members of a regional monetary arrangement that could deal with the vagaries of the global financial markets thus have to resort to controls of short-term capital flows or adopt a strategy of undervaluation and unilateral fixing (UNCTAD 2004).

To prevent manipulation of the exchange rate, wage rates, taxes or subsidies in the bid for global market shares, and to deter the financial markets from driving the competitive positions of nations in the wrong direction, a new code of conduct is needed that would regulate the overall competitiveness of nations. Such a code of conduct, as part of the global governance system, would have to balance the advantages of one country against the disadvantages of other, directly or indirectly, affected countries. For example, changes in the nominal exchange rate that deviate from the fundamentals (inflation differentials) affect international trade in exactly the same way as do changes in tariffs and export subsidies. Consequently, such real exchange-rate changes have to be subject to multilateral oversight and negotiations. Reasons for the deviation from the fundamentals and the necessary size of the deviation have to be identified by an international institution and enforced by a multilateral body. Such rules could help protect all trading parties against unjustified overall losses or gains from competitiveness, and developing countries could systematically avoid the trap of overvaluation that has been one of the major impediments to prosperity.

A long-term solution for the international financial system has to start with the recognition that the idea of a cooperative global monetary system is as compelling as the idea of a multilateral trading system. As with multilateral trade rules, a well-designed global financial system has to create equal conditions for all parties involved and help prevent unfair competition. Indeed, reasons for which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was founded more than 60 years ago are still largely valid. Avoiding competitive depreciations and other monetary distortions that have negative effects on the functioning of the international trading system is more important in today's highly interdependent world than at any other time in history.

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### Appendix



Figure A1: Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials (1995-2007) in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominica, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela).



Figure A2: Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials (1995-2007) in Sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal and South Africa).



Figure A3: Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials (1995-2007) in Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation and Bulgaria).



Figure A4: Uncovered interest returns, exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates differentials (1995-2007) in Asia (China, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Rep. Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (Province of China) and Thailand).



Figure A5: Average real exchange rate changes and uncovered interest returns per region, 1995-2006.