

Mapping the Discourse from Domination to Deprivation

A Case Study of Jats

Kalaiyaran A.

Introduction

The recent protest by the Jats for Other Backward Class (OBC) status in Haryana has opened up the debate on the relationship between economic process and changing caste realities in India (Jaffrelot 2016 and Palshikar 2016). The mobilization of Jats and their concerns have to be located in the twin processes initiated in 1991 - the Market following the economic liberalization and the Mandal by the implementation of reservation for the OBCs. These dual processes of the Market and Mandal have changed the economic and political reality of the state of Haryana. I use the term Market to describe the economic liberalization and Mandal to illustrate the political mobility of lower castes. This dual process is a significant cause for the current crisis of the Jats.

The Market signifies two broad economic processes. Led by economic liberalization, the Market offers higher returns to those who have higher education and acquired skills. The service-sector led current economic growth demands a certain level of education, social skills and attributes (Kumar and Subramanian 2012). The castes that are positioned above the Jats have inherited certain amounts of education and skills needed to be a part of this growth process. Since networks play a major role in accessing these sectors, caste also works as a premium (Munshi 2016). Those who do not fall within this caste network get excluded. Barring a few, the vast majority within castes such as Jats are excluded from this process.

The second vital outcome of the Market is the breaking of the structural link between agriculture and non-agriculture. Agriculture has lost its relevance as a driver

of economic growth. The sector's contribution to GDP has come down from about 31 % in 1990-91 to just 14 % in 2011-12. Both, the service sector and industry have overtaken agriculture. Traditionally, the latter was seen as providing surplus for industrial accumulation and markets for industrial commodities. However, such inter-sectoral linkage has weakened overtime. As a result, studies argue, the agrarian question of capital has been largely bypassed in India (Lerche 2013). The sector at best provides a livelihood for the large mass of surplus labour while relaxing the food constraint in capital accumulation process in India. As agriculture declined, the caste groups those are traditionally associated with agriculture such as the Jats also have lost their economic power.

On the other hand, with the Mandal, there has occurred the relative mobility of lower castes such as the OBCs and Dalits through reservations in government jobs and education.¹ Of these, education has become a route of greater mobility of these caste groups. Urbanization also contributed to this process and made the lower castes less dependent on the Jats (Chowdhry 2009). Along with this relative mobility, they (the lower castes) have also acquired greater capacity for negotiation with officials and politicians, something Harriss (2012) has termed as an emergence of 'naya netas'. These new leaders are now able to negotiate with the State to gain benefits and services for these caste groups. In other words, both economic and political mobility of lower castes has challenged conventional caste equations and generated anxieties among the Jats.

This paper argues that the dual process of the Market and Mandal dislocated Jats from their earlier economic and political positions. The Jats perceive those who are above them as moving at a faster rate and those who are below them as also moving, albeit marginally, while the Jats' own position has remained stagnant, if not slightly deteriorated. The community still remains largely agrarian and is composed of small and marginal farmers, and at times, farm labour. These twin processes, I argue, have disturbed the old social equilibrium. As a result, the Jats have responded to this crisis by changing the discourse from one of domination – a claim of a glorious past and Kshatria status – to a discourse of deprivation and a claim on the OBC status in

¹Although the Mandal offered reservation only to the OBCs, it had wider significance on the caste politics including that of Dalits in North India. Thus, the Mandal is not an act, a wider process where caste acquired central category of politics. For further reference, see Jaffrelot (2003).

order to get access to education and jobs (Datta 1999). This paper maps this process of dislocation of Jats and their response to the crisis. In other words, it is an attempt at locating the Jats' crisis in this overall changing reality of the political economy.

This paper is organised in the following order: The first section offers a historical narrative as to how Jats performed in the state before the Mandal and Market came into life. The second section explores the changing economic reality in the state. It looks at economic growth and employment generation and also offers insights on what this changing economic reality means to different caste groups in the state by mapping their relative income status and sources of income. The third section examines the effect of Mandal on the different communities and their educational status. The fourth and final section provides details on the differentiation within these caste groups and their implications.

I. Domination in Making

1. Jats before the Market and Mandal

The Jats are spread over several states in India. They are numerically concentrated in the states of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and western UP. Their socio-economic condition also varies across states. In terms of religion, they are divided into Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism. They are known as one of the prosperous agricultural castes in North India (Singh 2011).

The Jats gained their prosperity through two routes (Jaffrelot 2000). The first is through land reform, which although incomplete, enabled many among the Jats to become landowners. The second is through the Green Revolution. The Jats who had certain amount of land and investment capacity have largely gained from the Green Revolution package consisting of high-yielding seeds, chemical fertilizers and the development of irrigation. They became more prosperous and generated greater expectations for their own community.

The rural life as a peasant was romanticized and celebrated. The Jats' leaders such as Charan Singh, a former prime minister of India, concisely nurtured and romanticized such life style of Jats. Singh argued that "the peasant is an incorrigible individualist; for his avocation, season in and season out, can be carried on with a pair

of bullocks in the solitude of Nature without the necessity of having to give orders to, or, take orders from anybody" (cited in Jaffrelot2000, p.92). The peasant (read Jats) was seen as the master of his own destiny. This philosophy led Jats to believe that the village is 'a harmonious whole' and claimed it "was always a stronger moral unit than a factory. The sense of the community was a vital thing among the peasantry, providing a natural foundation for collaboration or co-operative action" (Singh 1959, p.270). This is a philosophy with which they built their organization called the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU).

The BKU, largely led by the Jats consistently articulated this vision in political terms to keep alive the moral foundation of the village community (Gupta 1997).It claimed to maintain an apolitical character, but often pushed the peasant question to the centre stage in political life through its hartals. Charan Singh took many of BKU's demands and articulated them in the political sphere. For instance, when he was the senior deputy prime minister in charge of finance in the Morarji Desai government in 1979, his budget was seen as the 'kulak budget'. It articulated the exact demands of the BKU. The budget mainly addressed the issues of "...reduction of several indirect taxes on mechanical tillers, diesel for electric water pumps, and chemical fertilizers, ...it lowered interest rates for rural loans; increased subsidy of minor irrigation; and earmarked funds for rural electrification and grain-storage facilities"(cited in Jaffrelot 2000, p.94). Though the BKU and Charan Singh claimed to promote the interest of farmers, the Jats were the biggest beneficiaries. They ignored others concerns, particularly of the landless poor and lower castes.

As Balagopal (1987) argues, this approach of BKU, like that of *Shetkari Sanghatana* in Maharashtra, has ignored the deep social cleavage and contradiction among classes, particularly between agricultural labourers and land owners within rural India. The concerns of the rural poor, and landless were in conflict with the middle and rich peasants whose concerns the BKU articulated. It is well worth noting here that Balagopal describes them as 'provincial propertied class' while M. N. Srinivas terms them dominant castes.

Though the BKU claimed that it represented all farmers, the Jats were the main constituents. The caste indeed functioned as the common uniting link among disparaged classes within the peasantry. Though they could mobilize many based on

the slogan 'village versus city' and 'monopoly capital versus farmers', the landless and lower caste concerns were hardly articulated in these movements. As Jaffrelot notes, Charan Singh who championed the cause of farmers, was of the opinion that "if wages have at all to be paid, in view of the fact that a large supply of idle labour is almost always available, the wages paid need only be subsistence wages" (cited in Jaffrelot 2000,p.92). Although he never openly articulated the caste position and subsumed it under peasant movement, the All-India Jat Mahasabha was on his side and supported all his claims as both their interests coincided. Both articulated the concerns of the same caste groups who owned some land and could sell their surplus crops. It only reinforced "the Jats' hegemony over the lower castes" (ibid.).²

II Domination in Breaking

2. The Market and Jats

As shown in the earlier section, the Jats built their prosperity through the Green Revolution and dominance through political mobilization of the BKU. Their philosophy and life styles are rooted in the idea of a village community. The Market led by economic liberalization posed challenges to their prosperity and dislocated them from their economic status. This section maps this dislocation of the Jats in the economic growth process.

2.1 Dynamics of Economic Growth

Indisputably, Haryana witnessed a consistently high economic growth rate. This was attributed to the economic reforms initiated by the states in the early 1990s. Haryana decisively embraced neo-liberal policies and has heavily subsidised the corporate sector through various tax exemptions.

Table 1 provides the sector-wise growth rate and the contribution of each sector to the aggregate growth in the state for the last three decades. The overall GDP growth of

² There are similar caste groups who share the concerns and anxieties of the Jats. They are Patels in Gujarat, Marathas in Maharashtra, Reddys and Kapus in Andhra Pradesh etc. Among them, the Marathas and Patels, like the Jats have become more prominent through their agitations for OBC status in recent times. These groups have also seen economic prosperity in the past, albeit by different routes. The Jats took the route of green revolution in north India while the dairy revolution and other related small businesses was the way out for the Patels. Sugarcane led co-operatives have been the route for the Marathas. All these communities it must be noted, were tied to land. Land has been the source of control of labour and social and political power in rural India. For further details on this, see Damodaran (2008).

the state for this period has been more than 6.8 %per annum which is slightly higher than the average of all India. The state has seen much higher growth of 9 % per annum in the last decade as compared to all India's average of 8 %. The state has, thus, managed to maintain the status of one of the richer states in India.

If the data is disaggregated, we find that in Haryana the growth rate of the service sector has been the highest. The growth rate of the service sector has been at 9.2 %and while India has been at 7.7 %per annum. For both Haryana and all India, Industry was the top performing sector in the 1980s while the service sector came to prominence since the 1990s.The further disaggregation of service sector shows that there is variation in growth rates among subsectors. Banking and insurance hasseen highest growth rates among sub sectors followed by the transport and communication sectors for both Haryana and India in the last thirty years.

Banking and insurance has grown of at the rate 12.3% per annum for Haryana for the same period and the corresponding growth rate for all India has been 11.6 % per annum. The transport and communication has grown at 10.4 %per annum for Haryana and 9.1 % per annum for India in the same period. A significant aspect in growth rates among sub sectors in the service sector in Haryana is the growth rate of real estate related activities in the 2000s. The growth rate of real estate has been 14.7 % per annum which is the highest as compared to any sector or subsector for Haryana and all India for the decade of 2000-10.

Table 1 : GSDP Growth Rate by Basic Economic Activities (CAGR)

Sector	Haryana				India			
	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	1980-2010	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	1980-2010
Agriculture	3.9 (28.1)	1.9 (14.5)	3.3 (8.9)	3.3 (13.5)	2.9 (22.5)	3.2 (13.4)	3.0 (6.8)	2.9 (10.6)
Industry	8.5 (33.3)	5.4 (30.9)	9.5 (29.9)	7.8 (29.9)	6.9 (30.3)	6.6 (24.7)	8.7 (27.3)	6.7 (27.5)
Manufacturing	10.0 (25.4)	5.8 (23.2)	7.3 (15.1)	7.7 (18.0)	7.3 (18.8)	7.2 (14.9)	8.8 (16.5)	6.9 (16.6)
Services	8 (38.6)	7.5 (54.6)	11.8 (61.4)	9.2 (56.6)	6.7 (47.2)	8 (61.9)	9.5 (65.8)	7.7 (61.9)
Transport, Storage & Communication	8 (5.7)	7.9 (9.2)	14.4 (14.0)	10.4 (11.8)	7.4 (7.5)	8.2 (9.7)	13.4 (17.0)	9.1 (13.9)
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants	8.7 (13.3)	7.9 (18.9)	11.3 (20.4)	9.5 (19.4)	6 (12.9)	8.6 (18.0)	9.2 (17.4)	7.6 (16.8)
Banking & Insurance	12.8 (3.1)	12.7 (7.1)	12.7 (6.0)	12.3 (5.5)	12.9 (5.9)	12.1 (10.0)	12.5 (10.5)	11.6 (9.3)
Real estate and Business services	4.5 (5.1)	4.1 (5.1)	14.7 (14.0)	8.1 (11.2)	3.6 (5.8)	4.5 (6.3)	8.7 (18.3)	5.3 (7.6)
Public Administration	9.0 (4.0)	6.2 (4.1)	6.0 (1.8)	6.7 (2.4)	8.0 (8.4)	6.3 (7.8)	6.0 (5.4)	6.0 (6.2)
Other services	5.7 (6.5)	5.5 (7.7)	7.5 (5.2)	6.0 (5.6)	5.3 (6.7)	7.5 (10.1)	6.9 (7.3)	6.9 (8.1)
GSDP	6.2 (100)	4.8 (100)	9 (100)	6.8 (100)	5.4 (100)	6.2 (100)	8 (100)	6.1 (100)

Note: GSDP at 1999-00 constant prices. Figures in parenthesis show contribution to GSDP Growth.
Source: Central Statistical Organization.

Manufacturing sector has grown at a faster rate in Haryana as compared to that of all India in the last three decades. However, the rate of growth came down from 10 % per annum in the 1980s to 7.7 % per annum in 2000s. The corresponding figures for all India are 7.3 and 8.8 % per annum respectively.

Agriculture too has performed better in Haryana in comparison to all India. The sector has grown at 3.3 % per annum in the state in the last three decades while India's has been at 2.9 % per annum. In the sub-periods, the growth rate of agriculture was higher in Haryana than that of India in the 1980s but it declined in the 1990s. The last decade has seen a slight revival of the sector in the state. However, the state has gradually neglected the sector in comparison to other sectors, which is very visible when one looks at the structure of growth and contribution of different sectors to aggregate growth.

Service sector has been the key driver of growth in the last three decades for both Haryana and all India. The service sector contribution to the overall growth is about 57 % for Haryana while it is 62 % for all India in the period of 1980-2010. The sector alone has contributed about 61 % of the overall economic growth in the last decade (2000s) in the state while the contribution is about 66 % for all India. The contribution of agriculture to the overall growth has been declining for both Haryana and all India. The sector's contribution to the aggregate growth was about 28 % in 1980s in the state and it has come down to 13.5 % in the 2000s. The corresponding figures for all India are 22.5 and 10.6 % respectively.

The contribution of industry to the overall growth was about 33 % in the 1980s and it has come down to 30 % in the 2000s. The corresponding figures for all India are about 30 % and 27.5 % respectively. Similarly, the contribution of service sector to the overall growth in the state was about 39 % in the 1980s and it has increased to 56.6 % in the 2000s. The corresponding figures for all India were 47 % and 65.8 % respectively. Among the sub sectors within the service sector, trade and hotels contributed about 19 % to the overall economic growth in the last three decades in Haryana. The corresponding figure for all India was about 17 %.

In sum, the structure of economy has moved from the agricultural sector to the service sector for both Haryana and all India. The key driver of this structural change and growth has been the service sector for both India and Haryana. This dual aspect of the growth process i.e., the decline of agriculture and emergence of service sector led growth process has significance importance for the Jats who are historically associated with the land and agriculture.

2.2 Employment Growth by Sectors

Haryana has witnessed structural changes in employment in the last two decades. The growth of employment has been relatively better in the state as compared to that of all India. For instance, during 1993-94 to 2011-12, aggregate employment growth in Haryana was 1.7 % per annum and the corresponding growth for all India was 1.3 % per annum (see table 2). There was significant difference in sub-periods as compared to the overall trend. The state has seen faster rate of employment growth in the first period during 1993-94 to 2004-05 as compared to that of 2004-05 to 2011-12. The

aggregate employment growth rate in the first period is 3.1 % per annum while the corresponding figure for the second period -0.4 %. The state saw a marginally negative growth rate.

Table 2 : Employment Growth by Sectors

<i>Sector</i>	<i>1993-94 to 2004-05</i>		<i>2004-05 to 2011-12</i>		<i>1993-94 to 2011-12</i>	
	<i>Haryana</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Haryana</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Haryana</i>	<i>India</i>
Agriculture	2.3	1.0	-3.0	-2.1	0.2	-0.2
Manufacturing	6.4	3.0	0.1	1.5	3.9	2.4
Construction	6.2	5.8	6.7	9.4	6.4	7.2
Service	2.6	3.0	1.2	2.5	2.0	2.8
All	3.1	1.9	-0.4	0.5	1.7	1.3

Source: Calculated by the author's using NSS employment round unit record data for the respective years

Among the sectors, it was construction that witnessed consistent growth in employment in the last two decades in the state (i.e., Haryana). For instance, in the period of 1993-94 to 2011-12, employment in agriculture has grown very marginally by 0.2 % per annum, while the service sector has seen 2.0% growth in employment per annum. Construction and manufacturing in the state have, during this period, witnessed significant growth in employment, i.e., 6.4 and 3.9 % respectively. As compared to Haryana, besides agriculture, all other sectors have seen positive growth of employment in India as a whole. Manufacturing too has seen 2.4 % employment growth per annum for all India.

In sum, agriculture has seen negative employment growth.³ The labour force has left agriculture and is largely absorbed in construction and service sectors. The caste-wise distribution of labour force that left agriculture explains the changing economic reality of Haryana. The caste groups tied with agriculture have lost their economic status. Who are these caste groups? We will return to this question later in the paper.

2.3 Relative Position of Castes by Income

3 Mehrotra et.al (2014) call this process as a ' historically unprecedented development in India's economic history'. Because, this is the first time in India's post-colonial economic history, such a scale of sectoral shift - from agriculture to non-agricultural - of workforce has ever occurred.

Table 3 provides basic statistics of households surveyed by the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) in Haryana.⁴ The survey covers about 1800 households and 9568 individuals in Haryana. The caste-wise population distribution may not reflect the actual composition of caste groups in the state as the sample was done at a national level. The caste categories are reconstructed based on the needs of this paper.⁵

Table 3 : Basic Statistics

<i>Caste Groups</i>	<i>Sample Persons</i>	<i>Sample HHs</i>	<i>Annual Per Capita Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>
Brahmin	908	174	56913	0.56
Forward*	1386	272	71086	0.64
Jats	1155	210	59182	0.54
OBCs	3411	620	31099	0.50
SCs	2641	517	20158	0.39
All Haryana	9568	1,806	39606	0.57

*The Forward excludes Brahmins and Jats


Source: Calculated by the author's using the IHDS 2011-12.

The average annual per capita income of Haryana is Rs. 39606 and inequality measured by Gini coefficient is 0.57. The difference in the average annual per capita incomes for caste groups reflects the caste hierarchy in the state. For instance, the annual per capita mean income for Brahmin is Rs. 56913 while it is Rs. 20158 for the SCs. The average annual per capita income for the Forward castes is highest in the state and it has Rs. 71086 followed by the Jats who have Rs. 59182. The corresponding figure for the OBCs is Rs.31099. As in the case of per capita income, inequality too is highest among the Forward castes. The Gini coefficient of the Forward caste is 0.64 while it is lowest among the SCs at 0.39. The corresponding figures for the Brahmins and Jats are 0.56 and 0.54 respectively. The Forward castes, Brahmins and Jats have both higher mean income and higher inequality as compared to that of the OBCs and SCs.

Table 4 :Annual Per Capital Mean Income (Rs.)

4 The Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) was done by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in collaboration with the University of Maryland. This paper uses the recent round i.e., the IHDS second round done in 2011-12. It is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 42,152 households done in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods across India.

5 The IHDS provides five caste categories; Brahmin, Forward (excluding Brahmin), OBCs and SCs and STs. The data also provides the caste list of the households surveyed. It is the first of its kind. We have filtered the caste list of households surveyed. There are 361 caste names in the survey for Haryana. Using their caste names, we have generated a separate category for Jats. The caste names used are JAAT, JAHT, JAT, JAT SIKH, JATH, JATT JHAT and RON JAT. The names are self reported. We filtered them further into the ones who fall under the Forward, who are non-OBCs and non-SCs. We, thus, broke the Forward castes into the Jats and Forward castes excluding Brahmins.



2.4 Main Sources of Income

Table 4 provides the main source of household income across caste groups in Haryana. Cultivation is the main source of income for about 24 % of households in the state. About 32 % households are into casual labour while 22 % of them are in salaried class. About 11 % households are in the petty shops and about 3 % in organized business. Those who are in organized business have highest per capita mean income of Rs. 212567 while casual labour has lowest mean income of Rs. 17290. The per capita mean income of the salaried classes (Rs. 54899) is higher than that of the cultivators (Rs. 37818). The corresponding figure for petty shops is Rs.39373. The difference in mean income among different occupation explains the difference in mean income of caste groups as the main occupation varies across the groups.

Table 4 : Main Source of Household Income Across Caste Groups

<i>Occupations</i>	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Forward</i>	<i>Jats</i>	<i>OBC</i>	<i>SCs</i>	<i>ALL Haryana</i>	<i>Per Capita Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>
Cultivation	15.3	22.4	67.0	26.5	6.3	24.1	37818	0.51
Casual labour	15.1	12.8	4.9	29.3	62.2	31.6	17290	0.34
Artisan	0.2	0.3	0.3	1.7	0.4	0.8	18214	0.39
Petty shop	8.4	21.5	5.7	12.6	5.2	10.9	39373	0.56
Organized Business	3.6	11.2	3.1	2.2	0.2	3.2	212567	0.72
Salaried	45.8	25.3	11.4	20.7	19.3	22.1	54899	0.46
Pension/Rent etc	9.5	2.2	2.3	4.2	3.7	4.0	38302	0.42
Others	2.2	4.3	5.4	3.0	2.7	3.3	23303	0.44
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	39606	0.57

Source: As in Table 3

For instance, the main source of income for about 46 % of households among Brahmins is salary while about 15 % households depend on cultivation and another 15 % depend on casual labour. Just about 3 % of Brahmins are in organised business. For the Forward castes, the main sources of income are distributed across occupations. About 25% are in salaried class and another about 22 % of them are in petty shops. Cultivation is the main source of income for about 22 % of households in this group. The Forward castes have about 11 % in organized business which is the highest as compared to that of any other caste group in the state. For the Jats, the biggest source of income is cultivation which is the highest as compared to any other group in the state. It has 67 % households dependent on cultivation and just 11 % of them are salaried. The percentage of salaried among the Jats is the lowest in the state.

The SCs and OBCs are better off in terms of having higher share in salaried class. The figures for the OBCs and SCs are about 21 % and 19 % respectively. For the OBCs, the sources of income are evenly distributed across occupations except business. Cultivators among the OBCs are about 27 % while casual labourers are 29 %. About 21 % of the OBCs are in salaried class and about 13 % are in petty shops. For the SCs, the main source of income is casual labour followed by salaried class. The most significant aspect of the trend is the Jats who are still tied to land and the majority of them are in cultivation. The average income in cultivation is lower than that of salaried, organized business and even that of petty shops.

The second most important aspect is that the Jats's share in salaried is lower than that of the OBCs and SCs. This is due to educational mobility and affirmative

action in government jobs enjoyed by the SCs and OBCs. As a result, they would have seen relative improvement and made it to the salaried class. The recent reports suggest that the rise of SCs in jobs and small business generates an unsettling effect among the Jats (Gildiyal 2015). As argued earlier, the Jats are still tied to cultivation while the others including the Dalits have diversified their economic activities

2.4 Distribution of Land

Table 5 provides details on the distribution of households who are in cultivation by size of land holding in Haryana. The average size of land holding in cultivation in the state has come down from 3.1 hectare in 1983 to 0.8 in 2011-12. The cultivators are largely from those categories which have less than one hectare and small. More than 90 % of cultivators are from these categories. The pattern of distribution has drastically changed over the last three decades. For instance, the percentage of large size holding (10 and above hectares) was about 10 % in 1983 and it has come down to just 0.3 % in 2011-12. The same is the case with the medium households (4 to 10 hectare). The medium size cultivators were about 14 % in 1983 and they have come down to just 4 % in 2011-12 while the category of less than one hectare size has gone up from about 57 % in 1983 to 73 % in 2011-12. This change in distribution of land holding has significant effects on the Jats in the state. As shown earlier, major source of income for the Jats continues to be cultivation (67 %). It can then be argued that the Jats are largely from those categories which have less than one hectare and small. Therefore, they feel vulnerable and insecure about their future today.

Table 5 : Distribution Rural Households by Size Class (Land Cultivated)

NSS Year	Size of Land Holding (in Hectare)						All	Average Size Holding
	Landless (<1)	Marginal (1 to 2)	Small (2 to 4)	Medium (4 to 10)	Large (10 and above)			
1983	56.5	6.3	13.2	14.3	9.7	100.0	3.1	
1987-88	56.1	12.1	14.1	13.6	4.1	100.0	2.0	
1993-94	64.7	11.8	13.8	7.7	2.1	100.0	1.3	
1999-00	65.7	11.6	12.2	9.3	1.2	100.0	1.3	
2004-05	75.4	9.7	9.7	4.7	0.6	100.0	0.8	
2009-10	71.5	12.2	10.8	4.7	0.9	100.0	0.9	
2011-12	73.4	9.8	12.4	4.0	0.3	100.0	0.8	

Source: Calculated by the author's using NSS employment round unit record data for the respective years

This section has shown that the Market led by economic liberalization has indeed produced growth and that growth has largely been led by the service sector. Agriculture has lost its relevance as the driver of the growth in the state. The agricultural labourers who were dependent on the Jats have moved up to the cities and could get some education and jobs. The caste groups such as Brahmins and Forward castes could exploit the opportunities opened up by the economic liberalization process. They diversified their economic activities, whereas the Jats lost out in this process. The Jats are stuck with cultivation and the relative income of cultivation is lesser than other occupations today. The average size of cultivation also has come down. If the Market has dislocated the Jats from their earlier economic position, the Mandal has challenged them in the political sphere.

III. Domination Challenged

3. The Mandal and Jats

The Jats are now in trouble with their own identity. The economic prosperity and social control over labour offered them a sense of superiority as well as the claim of Kshatriya status. The claim has its history – it was pushed through the Arya Samaj since colonial times and was denied by both forward castes and colonial authorities (Datta 1999). If the Market broke the Jats's economic status, the Mandal broke their political status. The sense of superiority gave way to the sense of loss. The claim of Kshatriya status was ceded to the OBCs status if not the Shudra status. The language of deprivation took over the language of domination.

The Jats have had an ambiguous journey with the Mandal. The Jats initially opposed inclusion into the OBC category as it hurt their caste pride. They were ambivalent. For instance, Devi Lal, a Jat leader, who was then the deputy prime minister in V.P. Singh government in 1991, was appointed as chairman of a committee for the implementation of the Mandal commission recommendations. But he was reluctant to do the job as the Jats were not included in the OBC category. Finally, when the decision was taken to implement the Mandal commission recommendations, Devi Lal resigned from the Government (Jaffrelot 2000). This signalled a division within middle caste groups into two folds in North India. Jaffrelot (*Ibid.*) characterizes this difference as between Kisan politics and Quota politics. The Jats opted for the Kisan politics while the rest courted the Quota politics.

Those who courted the Quotas have seen the rise of political power and economic mobility. Yogendra Yadav (1996) describes this as a 'second democratic upsurge'. He also argues that the category of OBC has acquired a vibrant and political subjectivity. Others counter the claim that it is confined only to interest groups to claim share in the State's power and resources (Jaffrelot 2000). Notwithstanding the contested claims, the Mandal along with the Market has indeed opened up alternative jobs for the lower castes.

Based on her field work in the state, Prem Chowdhry (2009) argues that the policy of reservation, education and acquisition of different skills have facilitated the Dalits' mobility. They could find new jobs other than their traditional ones and caste distinction is also blurring, which can otherwise be observed in segregated dwelling spaces. This 'homogenization in life style and appearance' generates anxiety among the dominant castes. It unsettles particularly the Jats in the state. Jagpal Singh (1997) notes that urbanisation offers a sense of anonymity and freedom to Dalits. The Dalits around Delhi, Chandigarh, Gurgaon or the cities which are located along the highway from Delhi to Chandigarh feel free and less dependent on dominant landowners for jobs. On the other hand, Dalit mobility is less in the interior districts like Rohtak, Jind, Sirsa, Hissar and Bhiwani, where they have to rely on landowners. Both education and urbanization have facilitated the mobility of lower castes in general.

It is in this context that the Jats's claim of educationally backwardness has to be seen. Table 6 provides details regarding educational attainment across caste groups in Haryana. The table also provides educational attainment at quintile five (top quintile) for different caste groups to map the caste difference among the top income groups (the cream of each caste group). The overall population of illiterates is about 33 % in Haryana. The Brahmins have the least illiterate population about 24 % while the SCs have the most illiterates at about 39 % of their population. The Jats have about 30 % of their population illiterate while the OBCs have about 35 % and the Forward castes have about 25 %.

Table 6 : Education by Income Quintiles and Caste

<i>Caste Groups</i>	<i>Illiterate</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Sec. and Hr. Secondary</i>	<i>Graduate and Above</i>	<i>All</i>
<i>All Haryana</i>					
Brahmin	24.2	30.1	30.3	15.4	100
Forward	25.3	34.0	26.5	14.2	100
Jats	30.2	36.8	27.2	5.8	100
OBC	34.5	40.2	20.0	5.4	100
SCs	38.7	43.8	15.3	2.1	100
All Haryana	32.9	38.8	21.5	6.8	100
<i>Quintile Five (Top)</i>					
Brahmin	22.2	22.0	29.8	26.0	100
Forward	16.7	30.0	28.7	24.6	100
Jats	27.2	35.3	28.3	9.3	100
OBC	19.2	34.6	35.2	11.0	100
SCs	28.8	28.5	32.0	10.6	100
All Haryana	21.6	31.2	31.1	16.2	100

Source: As in Table 3

As in Income, the Brahmins have done better in higher education also. The percentage of population who are graduates and above is about 15 % among the Brahmins while it is just about 2 % among the SCs. The corresponding figure for the Jats and OBCs are about 6 % and 5 % respectively. The figure for the Forward castes is very close to that of the Brahmins at about 14 %. The lack of access to higher education has been the main claim of the Jats. The Jats' performance is much lower than that of the Brahmins and Forward castes while it is closer to that of the OBCs and above that of the SCs.

The disaggregate figures by quintile present a sharp disparity even among the elite of caste groups in educational attainment. The percentage of graduates and above among the Brahmins is about 26 % in the top quintile. The corresponding figure for the Forward castes is about 25 % while it is just 9 % for the Jats. The figures for the OBCs and SCs are about 11 %. However, it is important to note here that the overall position of Jats in education is better than that of the OBCs and SCs. What unsettles them is the relative mobility of the cream among the OBCs and SCs.

In this quintile, the Jats's status of educational attainment is lowest among the creams in any caste groups in Haryana. As argued earlier, the Jats's mean income is second highest in the state while their educational attainment particularly in higher education is lowest in the state. There is clear disjunction between educational attainment and income mobility for the Jats. Their educational status does not correspond to their income status. For the similar income level, educational attainment among the OBCs and SCs is slightly above that of the Jats. This finding validates Prem Chowdhry's (2009) argument that the marginal mobility of SCs in education has unsettled the Jats. The Jats' claim of educational backwardness is not unfounded.

IV. Deprivation in Making

4. Differentiation within Jats

As stated earlier, the Jats are stuck in cultivation. The average size land holding in cultivation has come down over the last three decades. The vast majority among the Jats are in the category of marginal land holding, with low education and lower income. There is thus a sharp differentiation within the Jats.

4.1 Lorenz Curves

The graphical representation of inequality in per capita income is illustrated by the relative Lorenz curves of each caste groups in Figure 2. As argued elsewhere, there is sharp inequality within caste groups also. Such inequality is much sharper among the Forward castes, Brahmins and Jats as compared that of the SCs and OBCs. The Lorenz curve for SCs is very close to the 45-degree line while the curve for the Forward castes is far away from the central line. For other caste groups, the curves are placed between these two extremes. The Lorenz curve for the Jats is placed slightly above the OBCs but below the Brahmins. The figure only confirms the argument that there is sharp class formation within caste groups. This is much sharper among the Forward castes, Brahmins and Jats than that of the SCs and OBCs.

Figure 2: Relative Lorenz Curves for Per Capita Income




Table 7 provides income distribution by Quintiles across caste groups in Haryana. Inequality is much sharper within caste groups than between. The analysis only strengthens the earlier argument that there is a class formation within caste groups. This class divide is much deeper among the Brahmins, Forward castes and Jats as compared to that of the OBCs and SCs. For instance, the quintile five (top quintile) has about 64 % of total income among Brahmins while the bottom quintile has just about 3 % of its total income. The disparity is much higher among the Forward castes as compared to any other caste groups in the state. In this group, the top quintile has about 75 % of its total income while the bottom quintile has just 1 % of its total income.

Table 7 :Income Distribution by Quintiles⁶ across Caste Groups

<i>Income Quintiles</i>	<i>Brahmin</i>				<i>Forward</i>				<i>Jats</i>			
	<i>Pop. Share</i>	<i>Income Share</i>	<i>Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>	<i>Pop. Share</i>	<i>Income Share</i>	<i>Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>	<i>Pop. Share</i>	<i>Income Share</i>	<i>Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>
Q1	19.8	2.7	7831	0.32	12.0	1.0	6195	0.29	21.5	4.0	11191	0.27
Q2	19.1	6.4	19047	0.07	18.9	3.7	14254	0.09	16.9	6.4	22465	0.05
Q3	21.6	12.4	32604	0.09	19.1	6.3	24255	0.09	20.2	11.4	33907	0.08
Q4	16.9	15.0	50652	0.07	22.9	14.4	46348	0.11	17.9	15.8	52629	0.07
Q5	22.6	63.5	159855	0.41	27.2	74.6	202398	0.49	23.4	62.5	159430	0.42
All	100.0	100.0	56913	0.56	100.0	100.0	71086	0.64	100.0	100.0	59182	0.54
<i>Income Quintiles</i>	<i>OBCs</i>				<i>SCs</i>				<i>All Haryana</i>			
	<i>Pop. Share</i>	<i>Mean Income</i>	<i>Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>	<i>Pop. Share</i>	<i>Income Share</i>	<i>Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>	<i>Pop. Share</i>	<i>Income Share</i>	<i>Mean Income</i>	<i>Gini</i>
Q1	17.0	2.8	5175	0.22	19.8	5.9	6063	0.25	17.5	2.6	6053	0.26
Q2	18.0	6.7	11707	0.07	18.8	10.0	10881	0.06	18.5	5.9	12716	0.08
Q3	21.2	12.2	18100	0.07	19.3	14.4	15245	0.05	19.2	9.4	19674	0.07
Q4	20.2	19.2	29814	0.09	18.8	20.6	22464	0.07	21.0	16.9	32322	0.1
Q5	23.6	59.0	78211	0.31	23.3	49.1	43053	0.21	23.8	65.2	109871	0.43
All	100.0	100.0	31099	0.50	100.0	100.0	20158	0.39	100.0	100.0	39606	0.57

Source: As in Table 3

The Jats too have higher inequality next only to the Forward castes. The top quintile within the Jats controls about 63 % of total income while the bottom quintile has just 4 % of total income. The top quintile within the OBCs has 59 % of its total income while the bottom quintile has about 3 % of total income. As in the OBCs, the SCs too have lowest intra-caste disparity as compared to other caste groups in the state. The top quintile within the SCs has about 49 % of total income while the bottom quintile has about 5 % income. The Forward castes have highest intra-caste disparities followed by the Jats and Brahmins. The SCs has lowest intra-caste disparities followed by the OBCs. As stated earlier, this trend is closer to that of Gini coefficient among caste groups. The Gini coefficient was highest among the Forward castes, Jats and Brahmins while it was lowest among the SCs and OBCs.

⁶ The quintiles are slightly unevenly distributed tilting towards the top. They are generated using a weight provided by the IHDS. Since income is calculated at a household, not an individual, the income quintiles are weighted quintiles of households, not of individuals. The IHDS suggests that the top quintiles have more individuals because of high income households tend to have more individuals.

4.2 Inequality Decomposition

Table 8 gives the trend in inequality, the extent of inter and intra-group inequality among caste groups for Haryana. The table also provides sources of total intra-group inequality by sub-groups. Inequality measured by Theil Index is the highest among the Forward castes in Haryana. Inequality decomposition analysis for the state shows that the between component⁷ contributes about 15 % to the total income inequality in the state. Intra-group component continues to dominate in shaping the overall inequality in Haryana.⁸ The intra-group component constitutes about 85 % of total inequality in the state while the inter-group contributes about 15 %. The OBCs and SCs are marginalised as compared to the other groups. This is indicated by their negative sign in their contribution to the between-group component.

Table 8 : Inequality Decomposition by Caste Groups

<i>Caste Groups</i>	<i>Intra</i>	<i>Inter</i>	<i>Theil</i>
Brahmins	0.10	0.05	0.700
Forward	0.26	0.16	0.997
Jats	0.12	0.07	0.665
OBCs	0.13	-0.07	0.468
SCs	0.04	-0.10	0.261
Intra+Inter inequality	0.644	0.11	0.754
	85%	15%	100%

Source: As in Table 3

Within that, the Forward castes, Jats and OBCs contribute more than 80 % of total intra-inequality in the state. It only shows that there is sharp inequality in income within these groups. It may be either due to the class and creamy layer formation within a caste or grouping of disparate or unequal sub-castes in the same group.

As stated earlier, agriculture lost its relevance as a driver of economic growth. Those who have education and skills could get into the service and industry while the Jats are still tied to cultivation. The average size of cultivation has also come down. The

⁷ The impressions of between - group inequality and inter-group inequality are used interchangeably in the paper. So is the case with intra-group and within-group inequality.

⁸ The dominance of intra inequality in the inequality decomposition exercise is a generally accepted trend. As shown in Deshpande (2000) inter-caste inequality in Kerala is very low, yet she argues that caste matters as there is substantial difference in mean expenditure and other measures. Also, the between group inequality (Inter) is defined or influenced by the difference in population and consumption/income share of a subgroup while within (intra) is defined or influenced by the size of consumption/income share and their Theil index of a subgroup.

vast majority within the Jats are in the category of very marginal land holdings. Low land holding, low income and low education have generated a sense of deprivation among many within the Jats.

Conclusion

The Market led by economic liberalization initiated in 1991 has dislocated economic position of the Jats. It has disenfranchised them from their earlier position in terms of economic power and social status. They have clearly lost to those who have education and skills. If the Market has disturbed economic equilibrium, the Mandal has definitely changed the political and social equilibrium. The lower castes including the Dalits have seen relative mobility particularly in jobs and education. This dual process leads to a sense of loss for the Jats. As a result, their discourse has gone from domination to deprivation. They identify themselves as deprived now. This deprivation discourse is strategically being used to go back to the earlier pre-1991 position which is seen as one of social control and domination. Their demand for reservation is half-hearted. The slogan of “Give me reservation or abolish it” affirms this position. It is more of a threat than a demand. Even though they may get reservation the crisis would continue. If the Jats crisis is driven by deprivation, their desire is to restore an older social equilibrium.

Reference

- Anderson, Siwan et.al. (2016): "Distress in Maratha land?", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 17 December, Vol. 51, No. 51, pp. 14 -16.
- Balagopal, S. (1987): "An Ideology for the Provincial Propertied Class?", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 12 December, pp.2177-2178.
- Chowdhry, Prem (2009): "First Our Jobs Then Our Girls': The Dominant Caste Perceptions on the 'Rising' Dalits", *Economic & Political Weekly*, March, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 437-479.
- Chowdhry, Prem (2005): "Crisis of Masculinity in Haryana: The Unmarried, the Unemployed and the Aged", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 3 December, Vol. 40, No. 49, pp. 5189-5198.
- Damodaran, Harish (2008): *India's New Capitalists: Caste, Business and Industry in a Modern Nation*, (Ranikhet: Permanent Black).
- Datta, Monica (1999): "Jats: Trading Caste Status for Empowerment", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 23 April, Vol. 34, No. 45, p. 3172.
- Datta, Nonica (1999): "Backward Caste Movement Gains Ground", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 11 September, Vol. 34, No. 37, pp. 2630-2631.
- Desai, Sonali, Reeve Vanneman and National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi. India Human Development Survey-II (IHDS-II), 2011-12. ICPSR36151-v2. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2015-07-31. <http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36151.v2>.
- Deshpande (2000): "Does Caste Still Define Disparity? A Look at Inequality in Kerala, India". *The American Economic Review*, No.90 (2), pp. 322-325.
- Ghildiya, Subodh (2015): "Dalits' rise upper castes' envy in Haryana", *The Times of India*, 22 October.
- Gupta, D (1997): *Rivalry and Brotherhood: Politics in the Life of Farmers in Northern India*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press).
- Harriss, John (2012): "Reflections on Caste and Class, Hierarchy And Dominance", *Seminar*, May, No.633.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe (2000): "The Rise of the Other Backward Classes in the Hindi Belt", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 86-108.
- (2003): *India's Silent Revolution*, (New York: Colombia University Press).
- (2016), 'Why Jats want a quota', *The Indian Express*, 23 February.

- Kumar, Radhika (2016): "Stooping to Conquer Jats and Reservations in Haryana"
Economic & Political Weekly, 16 April, Vol. 2, No 16, pp. 15-17.
- Kumar, Ustav and Subramanian, Arvind (2012) 'Growth in India's States in the First Decade of the 21st Century', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol .47, No. 3, pp. 48-57.
- Lerche, Jens (2013): "The Agrarian Question in Neoliberal India: Agrarian Transition Bypassed?", *The Journal Agrarian Change*, Vol. 13, No. 3.
- Munshi, Kaivan (2016): Caste Networks in the Modern Indian Economy, In Mahindra Dev and P.G. Babu, eds., *Development in India: Micro and Macro Perspectives*, Springer.
- Palshikar, Suhas (2008): "Challenges before the Reservation Discourse". *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26 April, Vol. 43, No. 17, pp. 8-11.
- (2016): "The Coming Caste Wars", *Outlook*, and 31 October.
- Pradhan, M. C (1965): "The Jats of Northern India: Their Traditional Political System I", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 11 December, Vol. 17, No. 50, 11, pp 1821– 24.
- (1965): "The Jats of Northern India: Their Traditional Political System II," *Economic & Political Weekly*, 18 December, Vol. 17, No. 51,pp 1855–64.
- Mehrotra, Santosh et.al (2014): "Explaining Employment Trends in the Indian Economy: 1993-94 to 2011-12", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 9 August, Vol. 49, No, 32,pp. 49-57
- Singh, Ajit Kumar (2011): "Why Jat Reservations?", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 23 April, Vol. 46, No, 17, pp. 20-23.
- Singh Jagpal (1997): "Dalits in Haryana Politics", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 25 October, Vol. 32, No. 43, pp. 2787-2788.
- Srinivas, M. N. (1995): *Social Change in Modern India*. (New Delhi: Orient Longman).
- Yadav, Yogendra (1996): "Reconfiguration in Indian Politics. State Assembly Elections 1993-95." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 13 January.