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PRODID:-//Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research - ECPv4.1.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
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X-WR-CALNAME:Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160428T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160428T120000
DTSTAMP:20260624T031950
CREATED:20160428T040729
LAST-MODIFIED:20160428T040729
UID:3487-1461837600-1461844800@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Seminar : Consumption and Time-Use Effects of India's Employment Guarantee and Women's Participation
DESCRIPTION:Spaeaker : Dr. Bipasha Maity\n\nAbstract:\n\nThis paper examines the effects of the number of days worked by households under India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) on expenditure patterns\, food security and individual time-use. We use plausible exogenous variation in administrative bottlenecks regarding the timing of work provision as an instrument for the number of days worked. The paper finds that greater number of days worked increases household food expenditure\, and especially spending on dairy\, proteins\, vegetables-that are likely to raise nutritional status of children; with no effect on spending on adult goods like cigarettes and alcohol. Household food security is also found to improve. Households are also more likely to spend on clothing\, footwear\, school uniforms and fees of girls. These effects largely seem to be on account of women's participation in the programme. Greater adult participation in NREGA reduces leisure time for both boys and girls and raises time spent in school for younger girls. Women's dependence on domestic chores as their major activity is also found to fall. Overall\, the consumption effects indicate a likely improvement of children's welfare\, especially of girls. It is also reassuring that\, contrary to existing social norms about gender roles\, girls are unlikely to take time off from school to perform domestic tasks on account of greater adult participation in the programme.  
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/seminar-consumption-time-use-effects-indias-employment-guarantee-womens-participation/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160428T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160428T173000
DTSTAMP:20260624T031950
CREATED:20160428T041046
LAST-MODIFIED:20160428T041046
UID:3488-1461859200-1461864600@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Seminar : Ontoness Versus Unanimity in the Strategy-proof Social Choice Between Two Alternatives
DESCRIPTION:Speaker :  Dr. Anup Pramanik\n\nAbstract:\n\nIn this paper\, we study social choice functions (SCFs) for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the “full” preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework\, Larsson and Svensson (2006) characterizes unanimous and strategy-proof rules. However\, there are many onto and strategy-proof SCFs which are not unanimous. This paper studies the relationship between ontoness and unanimity while analyzing strategy-proof rules in this framework. In particular\, this paper shows the following results.\n\n\t Firstly\, we characterize the class of onto and strategy-proof rules.\n\t Then\, we show that unanimity and ontoness are equivalent for pairwise strategy-proof SCFs.\n\t Consensus rules are the only onto and strongly group strategy-proof rules (Barber`a et al. (2012)\, Manjunath (2012) and Harless (2015)). We strengthen this result replacing strongly group strategy-proofness by pairwise strategy-  proofness.\n\nFinally we provide a characterization of strict consensus rules. A strict consensus rule is anonymous\, onto and strategy-proof but not unanimous.  
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/seminar-ontoness-versus-unanimity-strategy-proof-social-choice-two-alternatives/
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