BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research - ECPv4.1.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20150108T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20150108T160000
DTSTAMP:20260425T002017
CREATED:20150915T124122
LAST-MODIFIED:20150915T124122
UID:348-1420732800-1420732800@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Oligopoly and the Finance Constraint
DESCRIPTION:We study the implication of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank financed oligopoly when firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations without or with credit rationing i.e. with a binding credit limit. When there is no credit rationing moderately higher cost of external finance may affect the degree of collusion\, but a substantial increase keeps it unaffected. Permanent adverse demand shock in this set up does not affect the possibility of collusion\, but may aggravate the finance constraint and eventually lead to collusion. We consider both Cournot and Bertrand cases and the results are qualitatively the same.  
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/oligopoly-and-the-finance-constraint/
LOCATION:IGIDR\, Mumbai\, Maharashtra\, India
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR