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X-WR-CALNAME:Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190614T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190614T160000
DTSTAMP:20260514T091723
CREATED:20190613T071026
LAST-MODIFIED:20190613T071359
UID:7944-1560528000-1560528000@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Seminar: The Refugee Allocation Problem-Matching with Indifferences
DESCRIPTION:Seminar by Dr. Swarnendu Chatterjee\, Indian Statistical Institute\, New Delhi.\n\nDate & Hour: 14 June 2019\, 4:00 pm\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall 1\n \nTitle: The Refugee Allocation Problem-Matching with Indifferences\n\nAbstract: This paper studies a matching model where refugee families are allowed to express preferences over hosts. In this model\, we show that the size of stable matchings are always the same. This has a policy implication: if we want to implement stable matching\, then there is no way to improve it in terms of the number of matched refugees. This is a counter-part of the Rural Hospital Theorem in the refugee matching set-up. Another important finding is that\, when refugee families are endowed with preferences then all stable matchings are maximal as well.
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/seminar-7/
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