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X-WR-CALNAME:Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160502T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160502T173000
DTSTAMP:20260514T055431
CREATED:20160502T060303
LAST-MODIFIED:20160502T060303
UID:3521-1462204800-1462210200@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Seminar : Asymmetric Dynamic Price Mechanism for Symmetric Buyers
DESCRIPTION:Speaker : Dr. Shraman Banerjee\n\n \n\nAbstract:\n\nWe consider a dynamic price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to a number of buyers before a deadline. The price in each period is sequentially rational. When the buyers are ex-ante symmetric but non-anonymous to the seller\, we propose an asymmetric mechanism that includes a horizontal price discrimination along with inter-temporal price discrimination. We show that the asymmetric mechanism generates higher revenue than the optimal symmetric mechanism in Horner and Samuelson (2011)\, even though the buyers are ex-ante symmetric. We use a priority-based tie-breaking allocation rule in place of the random allocation rule\, generally used for symmetric mechanisms\, to generate the asymmetric equilibrium.  
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/seminar-asymmetric-dynamic-price-mechanism-symmetric-buyers/
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