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PRODID:-//Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research - ECPv4.1.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
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X-WR-CALNAME:Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20220511T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20220511T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T044515
CREATED:20220510T072157
LAST-MODIFIED:20220510T073410
UID:13959-1652284800-1652288400@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Seminar:  Implementation In Undominated Strategies With Applications To Auction Design\, Public Good Provision And Matching
DESCRIPTION:\n\n[button link="https://youtu.be/an7GgMrx_f8"]Click Here To Watch Live On YouTube[/button]\nAbstract:-\nThis paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms\, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single-object auction\, the second-price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good provision prob- lem\, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism can be outperformed from the view-point of a designer who wishes to minimise deficit subject to efficiency. In the two-sided matching environment where preferences on one side of the market are private information\, the social choice correspondence that outputs all stable matchings at every preference profile\, is implementable.\n[ilink url="/newspdf/IUS_Applications.pdf"]Click to View Full Paper[/ilink]\n
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/seminar-implementation-undominated-strategies-applications-auction-design-public-good-provision-matching/
LOCATION:Mumbai\, India
CATEGORIES:Seminars,Upcoming events
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