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PRODID:-//Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research - ECPv4.1.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190527T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190527T160000
DTSTAMP:20260514T095551
CREATED:20190522T093223
LAST-MODIFIED:20190522T093223
UID:7732-1558972800-1558972800@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Seminar: Mechanism Design in Single Dimensional Type Spaces
DESCRIPTION:Seminar at IGIDR by Dr. Abdul Quadir\, Jamia Millia Islamia\, New Delhi.\n\nDate & Hour: 27 May 2019\, 4:00 pm\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall 1\n\nTitle: Mechanism Design in Single Dimensional Type Spaces\n\nAbstract: We consider a class of mechanism design problems in private value environment where the type of an agent is a single number. The preference over transfers is quasi-linear for every agent. We give a complete characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms for these problems. Further\, by imposing a suitable version of anonymity and non-bossiness along with dominant strategy incentive compatibility\, we characterize the Groves mechanisms.
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/seminar-mechanism-design-single-dimensional-type-spaces/
CATEGORIES:Upcoming events
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