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PRODID:-//Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research - ECPv4.1.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
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X-WR-CALNAME:Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160428T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160428T173000
DTSTAMP:20260504T215211
CREATED:20160428T041046
LAST-MODIFIED:20160428T041046
UID:3488-1461859200-1461864600@www.igidr.ac.in
SUMMARY:Seminar : Ontoness Versus Unanimity in the Strategy-proof Social Choice Between Two Alternatives
DESCRIPTION:Speaker :  Dr. Anup Pramanik\n\nAbstract:\n\nIn this paper\, we study social choice functions (SCFs) for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the “full” preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework\, Larsson and Svensson (2006) characterizes unanimous and strategy-proof rules. However\, there are many onto and strategy-proof SCFs which are not unanimous. This paper studies the relationship between ontoness and unanimity while analyzing strategy-proof rules in this framework. In particular\, this paper shows the following results.\n\n\t Firstly\, we characterize the class of onto and strategy-proof rules.\n\t Then\, we show that unanimity and ontoness are equivalent for pairwise strategy-proof SCFs.\n\t Consensus rules are the only onto and strongly group strategy-proof rules (Barber`a et al. (2012)\, Manjunath (2012) and Harless (2015)). We strengthen this result replacing strongly group strategy-proofness by pairwise strategy-  proofness.\n\nFinally we provide a characterization of strict consensus rules. A strict consensus rule is anonymous\, onto and strategy-proof but not unanimous.  
URL:http://www.igidr.ac.in/seminars/seminar-ontoness-versus-unanimity-strategy-proof-social-choice-two-alternatives/
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