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Seminar:”Sequential Coalitionally Fair and Core Allocations for Two-Period Economies” by Dr. Anuj Bhowmik
Dr. Anuj Bhowmik will be presenting a seminar on 21/04/2017 at 4.00 P.M. at Seminar Hall No.1.
Title: Sequential Coalitionally Fair and Core Allocations for Two-Period Economies
Extended Abstract:The cooperative game theoretic notions such as the core and coalitionally fair allocations are very useful in order to allocation the total resources available in the economy. In a static case, agreeing on such an allocation is equivalent to carrying it out since nothing happens in between. This is completely different in a dynamic model since agents might change their minds after an originally agreed upon contract has partially been carried out simply because it is no longer in their best interest to stick to it in the case of certainty and more information is available over time in an uncertain environment. We consider a two-period oligopolistic economy with asymmetric information in which the set of agents consists of some large agents and a continuum of small agents. The purpose of this paper is to consider sequential trades and study an extended notion of core and coalitionally fair allocations that are appropriate for this setting. We show that any non-sequential core allocation can be improved by a coalition of any given size less than the size of the grand coalition, such a result is an extension of similar results obtained in the past few decades. In addition, we establish that any core allocation is coalitionally fair in the sense that no coalition of negligible agents envies the net trade of any other coalition containing all non- negligible agents and vice versa. All our results are appropriate for two well-known models:
(i) an asymmetric information economy;
(ii) an asset market economy with the possibility of arbitrarily short-sell of assets.
Department of Economics, School of Humanities and Social sciences, Shiv Nadar University, INDIA
E-mail address: email@example.com Dipartimento diScienze Economiche e Statistiche and CSEF, University of Napoli Federico II, Complesso Monte S. Angelo, Via Cintia, 80126 Napoli, Italy
E-mail address: firstname.lastname@example.org