Shubhro’s areas of interest include Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Political Economy and Experimental Economics. His current research focuses on issues such as corruption in multi-dimensional public procurement auctions and how centre-state ideological differences or those within a ruling coalition stymie the process of privatization of public sector enterprises in India.
In the past he has worked on the optimal bargaining order in multilateral bargaining games comprising one buyer and multiple heterogeneous sellers and on the price path of goods such as airline tickets. He has also contributed to the literature on public goods provisioning games by constructing a model in which players make binary contributions, where early contributions reduce the cost of contribution of later contributors. The solution to such problems explains why whistle-blowers step forward with delay.
Shubhro completed his Phd from Pennsylvania State University and joined IGIDR in 2006. He received an M.A. in Economics from Jawaharlal Nehru University and a B.Sc. in Economics from Presidency College, Kolkata. He also received an Outstanding Undergraduate Instructor Award for the 2004 Fall semester and a Graduate Fellowship with Tuition Scholarship for the year 2000-2001 at Pennsylvania State University.
- “A Model of Airline Pricing: Capacity Constraints and Deadlines”, Journal of Quantitative Economics, July 2007, Volume 5, Number 2, 40-65. [PDF]
- “On Delays in Project Completion With Cost Reduction: An Experiment”, with Anthony M. Kwasnica, Southern Economic Journal, January 2011, Volume 77, Number 3, 557-584. [PDF]
- "Intertemporal Pricing with Capacity Constraint and Outside option", Journal of Economic Theory and Social Development, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2012, p 93-106.
- "Bargaining Order and Delays in Multilateral Bargaining with Asymmetric Sellers", Mathematical Social Sciences, forthcoming. [PDF]
- Microeconomics 1 (Compulsory)
- Public Economics (Compulsory)
- Industrial Organization (Optional)
- Game Theory (Optional)