IGIDR working Paper: Signaling through Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Generalization

NO : WP-2018-015

AUTHOR : Madhuparna Ganguly and Rupayan Pal

TITLE : Signaling through Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Generalization


This note shows that the argument of Saljanin(2017) [Saljanin, 2017. Signaling through publicantitrust enforcement, Economics Letters 169, 4 – 6] that public antitrust enforcement complements private investment is robust to allowing public investment in anti-trust enforcement to be productive. However, unlike as in the case of unproductive public investment, over investment in public antitrust enforcement does not necessarily signal that the government is pro-competition: in pooling equilibria either only the anti-competition government or both types of government over invests, whereas in the separating equilibrium only the pro-competition government over invests.

Keywords : Private and public enforcement, Signaling, Antitrust
JEL Code : H1, H4, K1, L1, L4

Weblink : http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2018-015.pdf