IGIDR Publication: Competitive Equilibria and Robust Efficiency with Club Goods

NO : WP-2022-014

AUTHOR : Anuj Bhowmik and Japneet Kaur

TITLE :  Competitive Equilibria and Robust Efficiency with Club Goods


The paper establishes an equivalence theorem (which states that an allocation is a club equilibrium
allocation if and only if it is robustly efficient) in a setting where individuals not only trade private
goods but can choose to become members of a finite number of clubs, where each club is defined by the
external characteristics of its participants and the project in which they are involved. Here competitive
equilibrium allocations are characterized using the veto power of the set of all agents, i.e. rather than
considering the blocking power of multiple coalitions, we only take the coalition comprising all agents
and study its blocking power in a group of economies attained by slightly modifying each agent’s initial

Keywords: Club goods, Robustly efficient allocations, core–Walras equivalence, Walrasian

JEL Code: D50, D51, D60, D61, D71

Weblink: http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2022-014.pdf